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l\BSTH}\CT 
The ::;tudy first locks a.t Fiji's n~lativcl.y high propensity to h11,ort 
in Uw conh~xt of C\ man:rinal micro-economy e:xic;i.inq in a tt'.Cnuou:; and 
depcndc~nt .n~latio11ship with the metropolitc:rn powers. The food components 
of Fiji's imports arc purticulorly highJ.ightcd. Evidence µrosont0d sccm3 
to indicate a r_rima L.1_C:_:!:_~ ca~.;e for a Food Self-Sufficiency Policy particularly 
as it rel.ates to rice. Certain hypotheses and impressions baE;ed on empirical 
observations are derived for further analyses. 
For these analyse::; to bu seen in pror.•er perspectiv•;s, the study then 
Jiscuss~s Fiji's rice production and marketing system and highlights such 
dist~lb~tion, rice irrigation, ~utritional and employment aspects, etc. 
Havincr ,done this, the sl:udy then focus;:e:cc on the oft-quoted rice and 
sugar cane competitiveness und att•:c.mpts at ~-.uh;3tanticl.l:i.!1'J tbis as::~erticn. 
en the various factors t!vi.t C'.m tr i but c~cJ 
to increased r1c2 imports, 
HavilF:J dL;cus:.::;i;d hol:.h the supply ci.nd demand aspc~cts r)f rice, Uw f;l:udy 
thlo~n attempts dL e::;timatinq Uv:; supply and. dE:m,'lnd trr~nds for ri.ce and 
dema.nrJ tr:cndf; indic>U:.c thJ.r. the va:d.ous po.Uc;ic~:; c1csiq1v•d to ev::-hie':c r;1.!l.f.-· 
sufficiency in ricn have not been effective. Jn analysing thcs~ policies 
dE; a packc.irJc, it: is concluded that it is not t.hoir dc~;iqn which is at. fault 
but .rather their co-01~d.inat.ion, orgilniza.t.ion, a.nd. fl leek of any appraisal 
mr:~ch<i.nism. 
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CHAPTER l 
FOOD SITUATION IN FIJI AND THE ROLE OF RICE 
I.I Preamble 
Fiji, like most of her Pacific neighbours and other island states in 
other parts of the world, may be categorized as a 'marginal micro-economy 
existing in a tenuous and dependent relationship with the metropolitan powers' 
(McGee 1975, p.7). Some of the general characteristics of such an economy 
are as follows: 
(a) The economy is generally export-based in which the major 
attention of the pre-Independence government was devoted 
to encouraging the production of cash crops for export. 
(b) Major exports may only consist of a few commodities 
whose prices are normally subject to great fluctuations. 
(c) Domestic resources are not sufficient for the economy's 
development programs. Therefore, great reliance on 
foreign resources (imports) is generally observed. 
However, because of (b) above, there is a general lack 
of foreign exchange to pay for all these imports. 
(d) General world inflation and high freight costs tend to 
make these imports very expensive. 
(e) The multiplicity of developmental programs which the 
government wishes to implement in order to comply with 
the people's desires for modernisation etc., often have 
high import content and these rA~ult in a relatively 
high marginal propensity to import for the country. 
No estimate of the marginal propensity to import is being proposed. 
However, indications that it is high, in terms of persistent Balance of 
Trade (See Appendix I.I) and Balance of Payment deficits (see Appendix 
1.2) and the still sizeable proportion of total imports vis-a-vis the 
Year 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
2 
TABLE l,l 
VALUE AND PROPORTION OF FOOD IMPORTS, 1964-1977 
Value of 
1 Food Imports 
(F$000) 
10,473 
12,202 
11,684 
12,651 
13, 329 
15,281 
16,884 
20,643 
25, 013 
33,909 
41,302 
38,504 
43,330 
53,819 
Value of 
All Imports 
(F$000) 
55,251 
58,162 
50,545 
56,291 
68,402 
77, 888 
90,502 
111, 550 
131, 549 
174,645 
219,331 
220,967 
238,040 
289,960 
Percentag~ of Value of 2 
Food Imports to all Imports 
19.0 
21.0 
23.l 
22.5 
19.5 
19.6 
18.7 
18.5 
19.0 
19.4 
18.8 
17.4 
18.2 
19.2 
Notes: 1. A simple time trend analysis of these values results in a 
s~gnificant regression coefficient (b) = 3260,9*, r = 0.944*, 
r = 0.891, t( ) = 9.905 and t(b) = 9.920. *indicates statistical 
Sources: 
significance aE the 5% level. . 
2. A similar time trend analysis rc~ults in the following: 
b = (-)0.237*, r = (-) 0.623*, r = 0.388, t(r) = (-) 2.759 
'.and t(b) = (-) 2.755. 
Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. · 
country's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) (See l\ppendix 1.3), are frequently 
stated in most government publications listed in the Bibliography. 
1.2 Needs for Increasing Food Imports 
Data in these publications show that of Fiji's total imports, food 
imports still constitute a significant porportion vis-a-vis GDP, despite 
a somewhat downward trend over the years (see ~ppendix 1.3). Other data 
that are available reveal an increasing trend in the value of food 
3 
imports (see Table 1.1) and in the quantity of some major imported food items, 
e.g., fresh meat (see Table 1.2) and rice as it will be discussed later in 
this chapter. 
Table 1.1, as indicated above, confirms the increasing trend in the 
value of food imports (see Note l in the Table) even though the percentage 
of food imports to all imports had shown a significant decline during the same 
period (see Note 2 in the same Table). The fact that this percentage has 
declined whilst the value of all imports has been increasing (see Table 1.1) 
implies that there has been a greater than proportionate increase in the 
importation of non-food items. 
Source: Current 
TABLE 1.2 
QUANTITY OF FRESH BEEF IMPORTS 
1968-1975 
Year Tonnes 
1968 57 
1969 39 
1970 44 
1971 91 
1972 129 
1973 67 
1974 384 
1975 967 
Economic Statistics, 1969-1978 
4 
Despite the somewhat downward trend of the proportion of food imports to 
GDP and the greater than proportionate increase in the imports of non-food 
items, the situations depicted above concerning food imports in general and 
particularly in the context of the total imports for the country, still 
present areas for concern. This concern is greatly magnified when considering 
that the needs to import, for an island state like Fiji, are numerous and 
would seem likely to increase, particularly in the area of food imports. 
This is so for the following reasons: 
(a) Increased urbanization tends to increase the number of people 
dependent on imported foodstuffs. 
(b) Changing food tastes and increasing preferences for imported 
and exotic foodstuffs. 
(c) Increasing demands by tourists, expatria~es and a growing 
local elite. 
(d) Irresponsiveness of local production to substitute for 
some of the commodities presently imported. 
These points will be further elaborated on in some of the chapters to 
follow. At this juncture, however, it is sufficient to note that when the 
various points raised above are considered together, they do emphasize the 
concern for increasing imports; and any government would be obliged to 
ascertain the various alternatives designed to circumvent this problem. 
1.3 Formulation of Food Self-Sufficiency Policy 
The government's Sixth and Seventh Development Plans, DP6 and DP7 (Central 
Planning Office (CPO) 1970 and 1975) used the term "Food self-sufficiency" 
policy to mean the replacement of certain imported foodstuffs with locally-
produced substitutes. 1 This appears to be a logical application of the term 
l Whilst DP6 (pp.116-117) confined the term to rice only, DP7 (p.65 ff) 
re-emphasized the importance of rice under this policy and implicitly 
extended the term to include other food items. 
5 
considering what has been said in the previous two sections. 
The rationale of such a policy becomes the more important when consider-
ing that out of Fiji's imports, foodstuffs are the most likely to be produced 
locally; and therefore should be encouraged. Furthermore, because of the 
expectations that food imports were likely to grow rather than decline, it 
certainly was considered desirable to reduce food imports by substituting 
some with locally-produced commodities. Considered in this context, DP7's 
extension o.f the policy to incorporate commodities other than rice, becomes 
meaningful. 
With the knowledge that Fiji has resources and the capacity to increase 
its local production, the government was not therefore discouraged by the 
irresponsiveness of local farmers to increase production. On the contrary, 
this apparent irresponsiveness became an incentive for the government to 
institute its self-sufficiency policy to revamp the agricultural stagnation1 
that has set in, and rural development in general. 
The government's other reasons for pursuing a food self-sufficiency 
policy, apart from those already mentioned, are not explicitly stated in 
either DP6 or DP7. However, they can be implie~ from the rhetoric of the 
two plans and the various objectives contained in other government literature. 
Some of these are as follows: 
(a) Food imports were proving expensive and the costs were 
increasing rapidly,as a result of inflationary pressures 
in countries of origin. These costs were making substantial 
demands on the limited foreign exchange which was greatly 
needed for capital and infrastructural -developments and 
1 This stagnation was particularly noticeable in the non-sugar agricultural 
production (DP7 op cit, p.2). DP7 further commented that the irresponsive-
ness of the agricultural sector was reflected in the level of food imports 
which accounted for about 10°6 of GDP immediately after the War, and virtually 
remained unchanged for many years. It will be noted that in 1965 (see 
Appendix 1.3), the percentage was still about the same. 
welfare investment. 
(b) From nutrition standpoint, it had been observed that the 
dietary change involved in the increased consumption of 
imported foods created nutritional problems. Therefore, 
it would be envisaged that by encouraging increased local 
food production, people in the urban areas in particular 
would be widely exposed to a wider and chaaper range of 
local foods which are considered nutritionally superior. 
(c) Seeing the increasing dependence on imported foodstuffs, 
concern was expressed that this might be detrimental to 
the possibilities for the growth of indigenous food 
production for cash sale. 
(d) A related concern to that in (c) above was that a 
persistent decline in traditional food production was 
likely to result in loss of skills in that productive 
process. 
6 
Thus far, it is clearly apparent that the food self-sufficiency policy 
represents a mix of policy instruments based on, inter alia, social objectives 
technological constraints and external account position. The policy should, 
therefore, be viewed and discussed in this broad perspective. 
When the policy is viewed from a restricted perspective, e.g. from a 
purely economic standpoint, it is likely that the policy will not be 
substantiated and will even be invalidated on the strength of the evidence 
presented. A popular economic argument against the food self-sufficiency 
policy is the concept of comparative advantage; and that is that if a 
country is already importing a certain commodity, it must be due to the fact 
that it costs more to produce it locally than to import it. Therefore, to 
decide through a food self-sufficiency policy to produce more of that 
7 
commodity locally in order to reduce import, it would cost the country a 
lot more than previously. This is basically an orthodox economic view. 
Other similar ones based on some principles of international trade etc., 
can also be presented. 
This rather restricted view of the policy, however, is an aberration. 
This explains why some proponents of food self-sufficiency policy have 
under-emphasized economic considerations, e.g. comparative advantage within 
the framework of the policy (vide, e.g. Goldman 1975, p.252 and Chonchol 
1975, p.59). 
1.4 Role of Rice.in Food Self~sufficiency Policy 
Rice imports constitute a substantial proportion of the total food 
import .bill. Table 1.3, for example, shows that 27% of food import costs 
in 1972 accrued to cereals and cereal preparation of which rice has a major 
share. 
TABLE 1.3 
PER CENT OF FOOD IMPORT COSTS 
BY PRINCIPAL FOOD CATEGORIES, 1972 
Food Category 
1. Meat & Meat Preparations 
2. Dairy Products & Eggs 
3. Fish & Fish Preparations 
4. ~ereals & Cereal Preparations 
5. Fruit & Vegetables 
6. Sugar, honey, etc. 
7. Coffee, tea, cocoa, etc. 
8. Miscellaneous 
1 
Total 
% 
12.3 
9.8 
29.l 
27 .o 
11.9 
1. 5 
4.8 
3.2 
99.6 
Note: 1. Categories of live animals and feeding stuff have been deleted 
from food imports. 
Source: McGee, T.G., 1975. 
This figure of 27% is likely to have increased since rice import has 
increased both in value (see Tables 1. 4 and 1. 5) and in quantity (see 
Table 1.6 and Figure 1.1) whilst the other major food import items in 
d . . . 1 Table l.3 have tende to decline due to increased local production. 
Figure 1.1 shows that rice imports have increased considerably since 1971. 
TABLE 1.4 
VALUE OF RICE I.MPORTS, 19fr7-1977 
(F$000 cif) 
Year F$1 
1967 1553 
1968 1206 
1969 1507 
1970 1136 
1971 1818 
1972 1351 
1973 3572 
1974 5525 
1975 4367 
1976 3544 
1977 (p) 5227 
Note: 1. A simple time trend analysis of these values results 2in a 
significant upward trend; b = 425.8*, r = 0.836*, r 0.699, 
t(r) = 4.571 and t(b) = 4.573. 
* indicates statistical significance at the 5% level. 
p = provisional 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
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1. e.g. data on imports of all fish in the Trade Reports (Bureau of Statistics 
1972-1977) show that imports increased at an average rate of 8.58% 
per year between 1968 and 1970. However, this has tended to decrease 
since then after the establishment of commercial fishing, the establish-
ment of a Fisheries Division and the Pacific Fishing Company (PAFCO) at 
Levuka. 
TABLE 1.5 
1 . 
CEREAL IMPORT UNIT VALUE INDEX 
(BASE 1972 QUARTERLY AVERAGE = lOO) 
Year Index 3 
1972 100.0 
1973 156.9 
1974 236.1 
1975 250.5 
1976 247.5 
19772 240.8 
Notes: 1. Includes rice 
2. Includes index for first quarter only 
3. A simple time trend analysis of the indices results in 
a 2significant upward trend; b = 28.291*, r = 0.848* 
r = 0.720, t = 3.205 and t( = 3.204. 
* indicates st~tistical signif121nce at the 5% level. 
Source: Current Economic Statistic, 1969-1978. 
At the same time when rice imports were increasing, the local rice 
production was somewhat stagnant (see Table 1. 7 and Figure 1.1). 
The big drop in production in 1959 and 1960 was caused by the 
extensive outbreak of rice yellows caused by leafhopper, sogata furcifera. 
It can be seen from the graph that rice production fluctuated to a great 
extent. On closer examination of the data, it can be seen that local rice 
production has been subject to the hazards and the unpredictabilities of 
climatic and other natural conditions, e.g. the unusually wet conditions 
of 1954, the.flood in 1965 or the drought in 1952 and'the hurricane also 
in 1952. Taken in a longer term perspective, local rice production can be 
seen to be virtually static. 
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TABLE 1.6 
QUANTITY OF RICE IMPORTS, 1947-1979 
(tonnes) 1 
Year Tonnes Year Tonnes 
1947 1964 5,400 
1948 1965 9,300 
1949 549 1966 7,200 
1950 1967 6,400 
1951 536 1968 6,471 
1952 1,009 1969 8,297 
1953 438 1970 6,659 
1954 663 1971 11,623 
1955 607 1972 11, 7C3 
1956 3,038 1973 17,240 
1957 1,916 1974 16,240 
1958 4,298 1975 14,359 
1959 8,221 1976 19,321 
1960 5,192 1977 23,983 
1961 4,200 1978 23,079 
1962 3,500 1979 24,552 
1963 3,900 
10 
Note: 1. These values are graphed in Figure 1.1 
Sources: 1. The Colonial Annual Reports, 1947-1973. 
2. IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
3. Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1959, 1966-1972. 
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TABLE 1.7 
LOCAL RICE PRODUCTION, 1947-1979 
(tonnes) 
Year Tonnes Year Tonnes 
1947 16,855 1964 17,983 
1948 17,475 1965 14,326 
1949 18,796 1966 14,326 
1950 24,718 1967 14,732 
1951 17,272 1968 17' 577 
1952 15,240 1969 17,272 
1953 25,000 1970 20,320 
1954 16,256 1971 17,272 
1955 23,000 1972 17' 272 
1956 23,0001 1973 15,697 
1957 18,000 1974 17' 272 
1958 24,000 2 1975 22 '964 
1959 2,227 3 1976 20,586 
1960 4,422 3 1977 17' 966 
1961 27,026 1978 16,015 
1962 21,946 1979 18,717 
1963 21,946 
Notes: 1. Rice damage by flood was extensive. The figure appears too high. 
Sources: 
2. Cr?p failure was experienced. The figure again appears too high. 
3. Revised figure after accounting for the extensive leafhopper 
damage. 
1. Colonial Annual Reports, 1947-1973 
2. IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
3. Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1959, 1966-1972. 
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FIGURE 1.1 
GRAPHS OF RICE IMPORT AND LOCAL 
RICE PRODUCTION, 1947-1979 
Quantity of local 
rice production 
Quantity of 
rice import 
57 59 61 63 65 67 69 71 73 75 77 
Years 
79 
f--' 
[\.) 
As regards the rice area, it can be seen in Table 1.8 and Figure 1.2 
l 
that there has been a significant downward trend. The popular reason 
for this decreasing area has been the competition from sugar cane for 
the same area (vide, e.g. DP 7 op cit, p. 76). However, this remark 
13 
needs to be further analysed to gain credence, and this will be the subject 
of Chapter 3. 
The rice situations depicted above created a prima facie case for a 
rice self-sufficiency policy for Fiji. In the light of this, therefore, 
DP6 first applied the policy to rice and this was reiterated in DP7. Both 
Plans also discussed the two major methods that the government was to 
encourage increased local production. These were: 
(a) To increase area of double-cropped irrigated rice; 
(b) To increase yields from rainfed, wetland and dryland 
rice cultivation. 
For incentives, the government was to provide the following: 
(a) Fertilizer and agro-chemical subsidies; 
(b) Subsidized water rates in irrigated areas; 
(c) Specialist Extension service; 
(d) Concerted Research efforts; 
(e) Drainage and Irrigation Division; 
(f) Special marketing arrangement with the Rewa Rice Limited; 
(g) Provision of certified seeds; 
(h) Seed testing facilities; 
(i) Non-institutionalized finance in the form of the Crop 
Production Loan Scheme. 
1. The trend line equation is as follows: 
Rice Area = 438401 - 218*T 
where r = (-)0.56*; t(r) 
2 
r 0.31 
t(b) = (-)3.481 
(-)3.52 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
TABLE 1.8 
RICE AREA, 1947-1975 
(hectares) 
Ha. Year 
10,298 1962 
13,952 1963 
14,906 1964 
14, 775 1965 
13, 902 1966 
14,260 1967 
14,828 1968 
14,151 1969 
14,151 1970 
13,962 1971 
14,063 1972 
12,627 1973 
3,136 1974 
3,136 1975 
12,991 
Sources: 1. Colonial Annual Reports, 1947-1973 
2. IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
Ha. 
12,991 
12,991 
9,996 
8,013 
8,013 
8,742 
10,118 
9,713 
10,781 
8,932 
8,903 
7,920 
8,800 
10,068 
3. Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1959, 1966-1972 
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FIGURE 1.2 
GRAPH OF RICE AREA, 1947-1975 
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As it was noted earlier, Fiji's rice industry has been somewhat 
stagnant and that rice imports have been increasing, particularly during 
the period of DP6 and DP7. Prima facie, it appears that government's 
objective to boost local production has been frustrated and that all the 
incentives enumerated above have been ineffective. This first intuitive 
remark is all more convincing when figures in Tables 1.9 and 1.10 are 
analysed. 
However, it is intended to delve into this matter a little further 
in Chapter 6 so as to reach an understanding of how the various government 
policies interact, and how the numerous constraints and unforeseen 
circumstances can militate against any plan or projection. 
1.5 Hypotheses Derived from Empirical Obse+vations 
From empirical observations, one can deduce certain hypotheses as 
provision explanations of observed facts. Two hypotheses, therefore, can 
be derived from all the empirical observations thus far. These are: 
(a) That the decline in rice area may be due to competition 
from sugar .cane. 
(b) That the increase in rice imports may be due to various 
factors mainly prices, marketing system and rising 
demand from the non-agricultural sector. 
Moreover,it is generally asserted that government policies have not 
performed as well as expected in terms of increasing the degree of self-
suff iciency, particularly in the context of government rural development 
objectives. This question will be examined in a general way. 
The above hypotheses and impressions,· however, are merely unproved 
theories or suppositions that need to be substantiated to be credible. 
1.6 Objectives of the Study 
This study will attempt to examine these hypotheses. However, prior 
to that, it is expedient to study some background on the rice production 
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TABLE 1.9 
EFFECTIVE RICE AREA STATISTICS 
(Hectares) 
1976 1977 1978 
DP 7 Actual % Com- DP 7 Actual % Com- DP 7 Es ti- % Com-
pl et ion pletion mated pletion 
Irrigated 988 650 65.8 1,336 794 59.4 1,741 929 53.4 
Rainf ed 10,120 8,492 83.9 10,729 8,593 80.l 10,931 8,166 74.7 
TOTAL 11,108 9,142 82.3 12,065 9,387 77.8 12 ,672 9,095 71.8 
Source: DP 7 Review: Agriculture. 
TABLE 1.10 
PADDY PRODUCTION, TARGETS AND ACTUAL PRODUCTION 
(Tonnes) 
1976 1977 1978 
DP 7 Actual % Com- DP 7 Actual % Com- DP Es ti- % Com-
pletion pletion mated pletion 
Irrigated 3,569 /.,295 64.3 4,876 2;647 54.3 6,406 2,995 46.8 
Rainfed 20,145 18,370 91.2 21,930 15,420 70.3 23,200 11, 370 49.0 
TOTAL 23,714 20,665 87.l 26,806 18,067 82.9 29,606 14,365 48.5 
Source: DP 7 Review: Agriculture. 
and marketing system in Fiji. This will be the subject of Chapter 2. 
Chapters 3 and 4 will subject hypotheses (a) and (b) respectively 
to further analyses. As it will be noted, hypothesis (a) is concerned 
about. the supply aspect of ·rice whilst hypothesis (b) is concerned about 
its demand aspects. 
Having discussed these aspects, it would be logical therefore to 
statistically estimate past trends in the supply and demand for rice 
and their projected values. Chapter 5 will attempt this analysis. 
This analysis is basically to ascertain the relative direction of output 
and consumption trends under current government policies and, moreover, 
the future trends given these same policies. 
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Chapter 6 then focuses on the stated impressions on policies, i.e .. to 
attempt to evaluate the various.government policies that operate within 
the framework of food self-sufficiency policy, and which tend to 
influence the trends that rice output and consumption would take. 
Chapter 7 merely concludes the discussions and draws on some of the 
major implications. 
1. 7 Methodology 
All other chapters except Chapter 5 will be basically descriptive, 
using simple analytical tools of simple regressions, tabulations and 
graphical illustrations. The approach is one of a problem-solving approach. 
That in Chapter 6 will adopt a less rigorous evaluative approach. 
The statistical analysis in Chapter 5 uses mainly simple extrapolation 
techniques and some multiple regression for projection purposes. Chapter 3 
also has a short section on statistical analysis. 
1.8 Discussions of the Data to be Used 
Secondary time-series data from various government publications are 
used. Apart from the statistical problems associated with time-series 
data, e.g. degrees of freedom etc., the other problems of limited data 
availability and the quality of data, presented major constraints. 
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These restricted the use of multiple regression models substantially 
as will be apparent. For instance, all the necessary time-series data 
that were available for a supply analysis (i.e. 13 year time-series 
aggregated data), were not sufficient for a meaningful supply analysis. 
D.G. Johnson (1961) had recommended a 20-30 year time-series data. 
Attempts at estimating demand functions were also constrained. 
Intriligator (1978, pp.63-64) points out that time-series data are 
inappropriate to analyse the interrelationships amongst the relevant 
variables compared to cross-sectional data. However, they would be 
adequate for projection in the short-run· situation. The problem encountered 
in the estimation was getting demand equations that have coefficients 
whose signs and magnitudes conform to economic theories. 
Another problem of time-series data is the degree of aggregation. 
This presents a problem of inadequate representation of the choice 
situations facing consumers. For example, consumers may choose between 
such related product as various cuts of meat, rather than between beef 
and mutton as products. Disaggregation on the basis of choice sets 
faced by consumers may produce quite different results from those based 
on physical corrunodity types. 
Finally, as Wold and Jureen (1953, p. 278) pointed out when estimating 
demand equations from time-series data, that prices, incomes and other 
regressors must display fairly large variation if their effect is to be 
established in terms of demand elasticities. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RICE PRODUCTION AND MARKETING SYSTEM IN FIJI 
2.1 Preamble 
The possibility of growing rice in the valley lands of the wet districts 
was first recognized in 1876 (Burn et al 1960, p. 35). Since then the rice 
industry has come a long way and the growing of rice, whilst still being 
confined generally to the valley lands, has certainly spread to other 
districts that are relatively dry. In fact~ the majoiity of rice currently 
being grown, is concentrated mainly in the drier zones of the two main 
islands of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu. 
The development of the rice 'industry since its inception has not been 
one of gradual escalation. As a matter of fact, when .the industry is 
viewed in a long-term perspective as from 1947, it can be said, as noted in 
Chapter 1, that the industry has been rather stagnant and it partly explains 
government's efforts in promoting the industry in recent years. 
This ch~pter looks at the various aspects of the rice industry, their 
interrelationships and how they are organized into a system. The objectives 
being, firstly, to study the various circumstances that are interacting 
within the industry in order to view the long-term trends of the various 
components of the industry in a better perspective. Secondly, to study the 
"subsistence 111 nature of most rice growers vis-a-vis the market orientation 
of others. 
1 The use of "subsistence" may be misleading. The writer believes that 
hardly any grower is totally subsistent in the sense that he and his 
family consume all the rice produced on the farm. In times of urgent 
needs for cash or when there is a surplus crop, a rice grower would 
consider marketing part of his crop. This aspect .will be further 
discussed later in the chapter. Therefore, the term "subsistence" may 
be replaced by a more explicit term, viz, "semi-subsistence". 
2.2 ,Production Aspects 
2.2.l Physical Aspects 
(a) Rainfall: The northern and western parts of the two main 
islands, which contain the majority of rice areas, are relatively dry 
with rainfall at around 178 cm. with a pronounced dry period from June 
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to August/September. The rainfall in the wetter areas in the south-
eastern parts of the two islands, on the other hand, averages about 305 cm 
and is higher inland. 
(b) Area Distribution: Table 2.1 shows a breakdown of rice areas by 
the three rice-growing divisions in Fiji (see map overleaf) and even though 
the figures presented are rather outdated, the breakdown can still be 
regarded as representative of .the current distribution of rice area in 
the country. It can be seen that the Western and Northern Divisions 
contain the majority of the rice areas in all the years showu. These two 
divisions also happen to be the sugar cane areas in the country. 
(c) Rice Growers: Rice growers are predominantly Indians. At one 
time, Fijians were enthusiastic about the crop. The Colonial Annual Reports 
stated that in 1948, Fijian rice growers had planted about 405 hectares of 
rice. This area doubled in the following year. The Reports also indicated 
that some Europeans and part-Europeans were growing rice in 1952. However, 
in 1958 and 1959, the situation had changed and the Fijians had reduced 
their acreage and the Indians had increased theirs. Based on the figures 
in Burn et al (op cit, p. 35), the rice area planted by Fijians had declined 
to 162 hectares and that Indian growers had planted over 96% of all rice 
grown in 1958. This percentage had increased from about 94% in 1950. 
The current estimate of the number of rice growers stands at 8,000 
(IBRD 1977, p.16; ADB 1978, p.41). The 1968 estimate, on the other hand, 
was about 9,500 (Fiji, CPO 1970) i.e., 5,000 from the Western Division, 
2,800 from the Northern Division and 1,700 from the Central Division. 
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TABLE 2.1 
FIJI'S DISTRIBUTION OF RICE AREA BY DIVISION, 1968-1972 
Western Central Northern Total 
Year 
Ha. % of Ha. % of Ha. % of Ha. % 
Total Total Total 
1968 3,587 36 2,258 23 4,017 41 9,862 100 
1970 3,702 34 3,038 28 4,050 38 10,790 100 
1971 2,471 28 2,695 30 3l 774 42 8,940 100 
1972 2,533 29 2,633 30 3,715 41 8,881 100 
Sources: 1. Sixth Development Plan 
2. Colonial Annual Reports, 1968-1972 
3. Department of Agricultural Annual Reports, 1968-1972. 
The Western and Northern Divisions contribute over 82% of the total. 
Rice growers are essentially smallholders. The World Bank (IBRD 
op cit) estimates that the national average farm area cultivated with rice 
is one hectare, and the current national yield stands at about 2.3 tonnes 
of paddy per hectare. 
2.2.2 Rice Production Systems 
1 Three rice production systems can be observed, viz: 
(i) Rice in-the cane area. This includes both rainfed and 
dryland·rice. 
(ii) Rice outside the cane area that is almost predominantly 
rainfed. 
(iii) Irrigated rice that is grown in specialized large-scale 
irrigation schemes also outside the sugar cane area. 
1 The categorization is arbitrary. The objective here is to facilitate 
the discussions in a later chapter on the likely competition between 
rice and sugar cane. 
WESTERN DIVISION 
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Most of the rice grown in Fiji falls into the first category and is 
actually cultivated by cane farmers (IBRD op cit, ADB op cit). Therefore, 
practically all the rice area in the Western Division and the majority in 
the Northern Division (see Table 2.1) fall into this category; and this 
rice would be grown by the majority of the 8,000 growers currently growing 
rice. 
Rice in the second category is found mainly in the Central Division 
and parts of the Northern Division viz., Bua Province and isolated pockets 
in Cakaudrove in southern Vanua Levu. 
The irrigated rice in the third category is located in three government-
sponsored irrigation schemes, viz: Rewa and Navua in the Central Division 
and Dreketi in the Northern Division. 
Of all the rice grown, about 90% is rainfed (IBRD op cit; ADB op cit) 
which is normally transplanted compared to the dryland rice which is either 
broadcast or drilled. Watson (1956, p.45) had earlier estimated that about 
60% of all the rice grown in Fiji was transplanted. The disparity in the 
two percentages above may imply that transplanting might have gained 
popularity over the years. This would have been so since transplanted rice 
tends to produce better yields than non-transplanted rice, and growers 
would have resorted to it for increased production. 
Comparative data on output and yield of each production system are 
not available. Those corresponding to the divisions, however, are available 
and would be sufficient approximation of output and yield for each system 
within a division. Table 2.2 shows that in 1968; 5,994 tonnes were 
produced in the Western Division (i.e. practically all in the cane area). 
The Northern Division produced 6,502 tonnes of paddy. Assuming that the 
majority of the Northern Division's output, say a reasonable 60% or 3,901 
tonnes, was produced within the cane area, then the total of all paddy 
TABLE 2.2 
OUTPUT AND YIELD OF PADDY BY DIVISION, 1968 
Division 
Western 
Central 
Northern 
Total or 
Average 
Output 
(tonnes) 
5,994 
5,080 
6,502 
17,576 
Area 
(hectares) 
3,587 
2,258 
4,017 
9,862 
Yield 
(tonnes/ 
hectare) 
1. 7 
2.2 
1.6 
1. 8 
Sources: 1. Colonial Annual Reports, 1968 
2. Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1968 
3. IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ. 
4. Sixth Developm.ent Plan 
produced in the first production system is some 9,895 tonnes or 56% of 
the the total production. The yields in these two divisions, however, 
appear to be below the average .in that particular year, as indicated in 
Table 2.2. 
The output from the Central Division and the balance from 
the Northern Division would constitute the output from the second 
production system. No output from the third system was realized in 1968 
since irrigation schemes began producing after that year. 
Given the categorization of rice systems above, it is 
expedient to discuss the relationship between rice and other crops that 
are cultivated within the same locality. In the first category, it is 
well-documented that some competition between rice and sugar cane exists 
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(e.g. vide Fiji. CPO 1975, p.76). This likely competition will be analysed 
in depth in Chapter 3. However, discussions on some general observations 
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may be relevant at this juncture. For example, the figures for the 
Western Division in Table 2.1 show that the areas for 1971 and 1972 were 
substantially below the 1970 area. This, according to the Department of 
Agriculture Annual Reports for 1971 and 1972, was due to two factors 
relating to sugar cane. In the first place, it was observed that sugar 
cane plantin~ had increased in many areas in that Division and area for 
rice had declined subsequently. Secondly, the sugar cane season had 
protracted somewhat and this delayed the land preparation and planting 
of rice since growers were still involved in cane harvesting and milling. 
This observation implies that rice and sugar cane tend to compete both 
for land and manhours. 
In the second category of rice production system, little competition 
1 is observed. Generally speaking, rice here and as well as in the 
irrigation schemes for that matter, tends to be land-specific. One obvious 
reason for this land specificity is that constructing bunds and water 
canals are labour- and time-intensive activities and the former, in 
particular, requires machine work which may not be easily acquired. 
Therefore, growers would tend to maintain their rice fields rather than 
ploughing them up for other crops. 
Production inputs into the first and second categories of rice 
system tend to be relatively low. Tenureship of the land can be either 
2 Native Lease, Crown Lease or Freehold. The labour used is essentially 
family labour, though some landlords outside the cane area do hire non-
1 Some crop rotation usually with pulses is practised, and some mixed 
cropping with dryland rice. 
2 The fear of land insecurity that had discouraged some rice improvement 
work in some areas including the cane areas, appeared to have been allayed 
by the provisions of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act 
of 1976 which legislate? for a 30-year lease rather than 10 years. 
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family labour for rice work. The use of fertilizer is minimal. 1 However, 
the use of agro-chemicals is more popular probably due to the high 
incidence of rice diseases and pest infestation. Mechanization is 
restricted. However, the use of sprayers is becoming increasingly popular 
and some growers use seed drills. 2 
Production inputs into irrigated rice, on the other hand, are 
relatively greater and mechanization level is higher. For example, in 1969, 
combine ha.rvesters were first introduced in the Rewa Irrigation Scheme for 
a trial run. 
To boost rice production, the government has been involved in the 
subsidization of some of these inputs viz, fertilizer, agro-chemicals, 
irrigation w~ter, certified rice seeds and credit. Of these, only two are 
rice-specific, i.e. irrigation water in government sponsored irrigation 
schemes and certified rice seeds. 3 
Despite these subsidies, costs of production have been noted to have 
. d 4 increase . Tables 2.3 and 2.4 show results of two exercises on Gross 
Margins. The variable costs in Table 2.3 do not take labour into account, 
whereas those in Table 2.4 do. Therefore, if we assumed a relatively high 
50% labour cost in Table 2.3, this would increase the variable costs to 
1 The 1950 Colonial Annual Report of Fiji stated that fertilizer was 
largely confined to the sugar cane industry. Furthermore, the World 
Bank in 1977 (IBRD op cit, p.19) estimated that less than 10% of the 
fertilizer available in Fiji is being used for crops other than sugar. 
2 The 1970 Department of Agriculture Annual Report stated that about 
405 hectares of rice were drilled every year in the Northern Division. 
3 A Seed Testing Laboratory was first established in Nausori in 1971. 
However, a new building with better facilities, was completed in 1977 
to replace the former (DP7 Review: Agriculture). 
4 A substantial proportion of the costs are non-cash. Costs, therefore, 
could be viewed from the standpoint of opportunity costs or opportunities 
foregone. 
TABLE 2'.3 
RICE - GROSS MARGINS 1 , 1975 
$ 
5 ac 1 ac 
Gross Return 540.00 108.00 
Variable Costs 124.00 24.80 
Gross Margins 83.20 
Note: 1 Based on a 5 acre rice farm, producing a single crop 
@ 0.6 tons/acre and selling at $180/ton. Family labour 
costs are not accounted for. 
Source: FAO/IBRD Report No. 29/75 FIJI 5. 
TABLE 2.4 
. RICE - GROSS MARGINS, 1978 
Gross return/ac/crop 
Variable costs/ac/crop 
. ·. Gross Margins 
. 1 Irrigated 
Optimum Average 
252.00 225.00 
149.00 149.00 
103.00 76.00 
$ 
Rain-fed2 
Optimum Average 
216.00 162.00 
145.00 113. 00 
71.00 49.00 
Notes: 1 The optimum farm produces 1.4 tons/acre/crop. Whilst the 
corresponding figure for the average farm is 1.25 tons. 
28 
2 Corresponding figures for the rainfed farms are 1.2 tons·and 0.9 
tons respectively. Labour is costed at $3.00 per 8 hour day, 
although with family labour this does not involve a cash outlay. 
The price per ton of paddy is $180.00 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
$37.20/acre and reduce the Gross Margins to $70.80. It can be seen that 
the 1975 (i.e. in Table 2.3) variable costs with labour costs included, 
are still lower than those in 1978 (i.e. in Table 2.4). For a fair 
comparison, the new variable costs (i.e. $37.20) of Table 2.3 should be 
compared with those in the last column of Table 2.4., i.e. $113.00 since 
the rice conditions in the representative farms being studied tend to be 
similar. This would then allow one to conclude in general terms that 
costs have increased over the years. 
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The cost data and Gross Margins of Table 2.3 and those in the last two 
columns of Table 2.4 tend to reflect to a large extent the situation in 
the first two categories of rice production system. In the absence of 
comparative costs of individual items, it is difficult to establish 
vigorously the cost inflation that has taken place. The situation is 
exacerbated by the fact that farm costs are not reflected in the 
Consumer Price Index. However, price control has been imposed on these 
farm inputs since 1976 and this is indicative of the general high prices 
that had prevailed. 
The corresponding costs and gross margins for irrigated farm in 
Table 2.4 represent the situation in the third category of rice production 
system. A detailed costing exercise of items required under this production 
system for the year 1979 is done in Table 2.5. The total cost of $129.20, 
however, should not be compared to that of $149.10 in Table 2.4 for 
ascertaining cost differential due to inflation since details of specific 
cost components of Table 2.4 are not available. Nevertheless, the Table 
serves to establish the various cost items and some ideas about manpower 
requirements. 
One specific cost that contributes to the variable costs is labour, 
particularly on irrigated farms, and it can be demonstrated to a reasonable 
TABLE 2.5 
PRODUCTION COSTS FOR IRRIGATED RICE SYSTEM, 
LAKENA IRRIGATION SCHEME (1979) 1 
Operation Cost/ac./crop 
( $) 
Provided by Management 
Land preparation 20.00 
Land rates - $1/ac/6 month season 1.00 
Water rates 8.00 
Seeds - 30 Kg. 7.20 
Fertilizer 12.00 
Insecticides 15.00 
Weedicides 5.00 
Provided by Farmer 
Soaking/incubating 15 min/day for 2 days @ $4/day 0.25 
Furrowing 2 hr/ac for 1 man 1.00 
Sowing (broadcast) 1 hr/ac for 1 man 0.50 
Spraying - weedicide 2 hr/ac for 1 man (2 spraying) 1.00 
- MCA 1/2 hr/ac for 1 man 0.25 
- insecticide 2 hr/ac for 1 man (5 spraying) 5.00 
Hand harvesting 8 hr/ac for 10 men 40.00 
Threshing 1 hr/ac 12.00 
Misceallaneous 1.00 
TOTAL $129.20 
Note: 1 The costing is based on an average irrigated unit on the 
Rewa Irrigation Scheme, when no rice harvester is provided.· 
Where a harvester is provided, it would cost the farmer 
$25/acre, but of course, the farmer saves on costs of hand 
harvesting and threshing. 
Source: Farm Manager, Lakena (Rewa) Irrigation Scheme. 
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degree ·of accuracy that it has increased. Table 2.6 shows the daily mean 
wages of wage earners in the agricultural sector. If we assumed that these 
represent the wages paid to farm labourers, then it could be concluded that 
these have increased over the years. From the Table, it can be seen that 
the daily mean wages increased at a rate of 10.74% per year between 1965 
Note: 
Sourc::e: 
TABLE 2.6 
DAILY MEAN WAGES OF WAGE EARNERS 
IN AGRICULTURE, 1965-1976 (Current Prices) 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
Av. growth rate p.a. 
Fijian Dollars 
1.48 
1.61 
1.62 
1.58 
1. 78 
1. 97 
2 .13 
2.39 
3.12 
4.49 
4.98 
5.03 
1 Derived from H.P. Brown's Growth Rate Tables 1965. 
Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
1 
and 1976. 
2.2.3 Large-scale Irrigation of Rice 
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Apart from inputs subsidization and the provisions of other farm inputs 
like Research, Extension Services2 etc., the government is also involved in 
large-scale irrigation work. This, however, is relatively a new 
phenomenon in Fiji. Large-scale irrigation of .rice properly started in 
1966 with a Pre~Investment Survey and a pilot project in Rewa and Navua. 
The former was a combined UNDP/Fiji Government project. The year 1968 
saw the completion of the Rewa Scheme and the first harvest from it in the 
following year realized about 287 tonnes from about 94 hectares. The best 
yield obtained was about 4.7 tonnes per hectare (Fiji Colonial Office 1969). 
Other related developments ensued. In 1972, a Drainage and Irrigation 
Division of the ~inistry of Agriculture and Fisheries was established and 
took over management of the Rewa Scheme in the same year. At the same time 
a United Nations engineer was appointed to start on the irrigation work in 
Dreketi in Vanua Levu, and an agricultural engineer to start work on small 
drainage schemes in Bua also in Vanua Levu. To provide a guaranteed 
market for rice being produced on the Rewa Scheme, the government bought 
the Rewa Rice Industry from the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Limited 
based in Nausori and adjacent to the Scheme. 
Table 2.7 shows that the area achieved under irrigation had increased 
to 700 hectares by 1975. The achievements for part of the Seventh 
Development Plan period are also shown. It can be seen from the Table that 
the y.ields of irrigated rice are quite high compared to those of rainfed 
rice. Furthermore, the Table also shows that the proportion of the area 
1 In 1965 the Colonial Annual Report stated that high labour costs had 
discouraged other than family rice production units. 
2 An analysis of the performance o.f government policies will be discussed · 
in Chapter 6. 
TABLE 2.7 
GROWTH OF PADDY PRODUCTION, 1970-1978 
Harvested Area (Ha) 
Irrigated 
Rainfed 
Paddy Production (tonnes) 
Irrigated 
Rainfed 
Yield (tonnes/hectare) 
Irrigated 
Rainfed 
Proportion of irrigated 
area to total area (%) 
Proportion of irrigated 
paddy production to 
total production (%) 
Note: 1 Estimated 
1970 
10,656 
2 
10,656 
20,320 
20,320 
1. 91 
YEARS 
1975 1976 
10,068 9,142 
700 650 
9,368 8,492 
22 I 964 20,665 
2,625 2,295 
20,339 18,370 
3.75 3.53 
2.17 2.16 
7.0 7.1 
11.4 11.1 
1977 19781 
9,387 9,095 
794 929 
8,593 8,166 
18,067 14,365 
2,647 2,995 
15,420 11, 370 
3.33 3.22 
1. 79 1. 39 
8.4 10.2 
14.7 20.8 
2 Tlie Colonial Annual Reports stated that 194 hectares were 
harvested in the Rewa Scheme in 1970 and 202 hectares in 
1971. These, however, were grown as part of the pilot 
project. 
Sources: 1. IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
2. DP 7 Review: Agriculture. 
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under irrigated rice is increasing and as well as th~ proportion of 
irrigated rice production relative to the total production. 
The irrigation work in Rewa and Navua is now finished. Irrigation 
construction is now in progress in the Dreketi Scheme in Vanua Levu. 
At the completion of the Rewa Scheme, the area of irrigated rice was 
316 hectares. The corresponding figure for Navua was 57 hectares. At the 
end of 1977, 75 hectares were producing irrigated rice at Dreketi and this 
area was projected to increase by 40 hectares per year·up to 1980 (DP 7 
Review: Agriculture). 
2.2.4 Subsistence or Market Orientation of Rice Growers 
The predominance of subsistence rice production over conunercial 
production is well-documented (e.g. vide IBRD op cit, p.16; ADB op cit, 
p.41). These documents also suggest that the majority of these subsistence 
rice growers are cane farmers in the Northern and Western Divisions as 
noted earlier. A substantial proportion of the paddy production in the 
two Divisions shown in Table 2.1 would, therefore, be for subsistence. 
The magnitude of the subsistence rice vis-a-vis the marketable surplus 
cannot be accurately determined for two reasons. Firstly, for lack, of 
1 data, and secondly, because of the variability of the marketable surplus 
which is subject to farmers' decisions on whether to market their produce 
or to retain it. As briefly mentioned earlier, these rice growers do 
market some of their rice from their "subsistence" stock when the needs 
arise. 
1 The quantity harvested may directly determine the size of this 
marketable surplus. In 1955 extremely good harvests were realized. 
The Colonial Annual Report for that year stated that some growers 
experienced temporary difficulties in disposing of their crop. 
The reverse when harvests were poor and paddy (and rice seeds also) 
sale declined, was observed in the Western Division in 1972. 
(Fiji Department of Agriculture 1972). 
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However, some estimates can be derived by studying the 1972 Northern 
Division rice harvest data contained in the Annual Report of the Department 
of Agriculture. The report stated that of the 5,385 tonnes of paddy 
produced in that Division, about 66% was retained for subsistence use and 
for seeds. The balance, 34%, was to be marketed locally within the 
Division. The Northern Division's harvest included paddy from farmers in 
Bua who are generally more market-oriented compared to rice growers in 
the cane area in Macuata province. These Bua farmers and others like them 
are the likely main contributors to the 34% of paddy that is marketed. 
Comparative figures for the Western Division are not available. 
However, it can be said that rice growers in this Division are essentially 
cane growers unlike their counterparts in Bua for example. Therefore, 
their main preoccupation would be sugar cane being their cash crop, and 
they would tend to be more subsistence oriented as far as rice is concerned. 
It would be expected, therefore, that their proportion of subsistence rice 
production would be relatively greater than that of the Northern Division 
rice farmers. 
The corresponding proportion in the Central Division which includes 
the irrigated rice farmers, would be expected to be lowest, i.e. their 
proportion of marketable surplus would be highest. 
Considering the national situation, it can be seen from Table 2.7 
that the paddy production for irrigated rice farms constituted some 11.4% 
of the total paddy output in 1975 and estimated to be 20.8% in 1978. 
This proportion o.f the total output in addition to a small proportion of 
marketable surplus from ·rainfed paddy production represents the commercial 
sale of paddy in Fiji. The irrigated paddy production from the Rewa 
Irrigation Scheme, in particular, is purchased by the Rewa Rice Limited 
which processes it for distribution to wholesalers. 
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2.2.5 Nutritional Aspects of Rice 
Rice is the main staple food for Indians both in the ·rural and urban 
areas (Chandra 1978, p.321). Table 2.8 shows that rice, apart from 
roti (made from wheat flour) provides the cereal component of a rural 
Indian diet. The diet component of rural Fijians are also shown for 
comparison.· In recent nutritional surveys, Fijians are observed to be 
increasingly consuming rice (Parkinson 1973, p.86). This is true for 
bth 1 db ... 1 o rura an ur an F1]1ans. 
Table 2.9 shows an attempt to quantify the per capita intake of 
calories and protein for the country as a whole. The contribution of 
local rice would feature most in the vegetables food type, and as can 
be seen, its contributions to national calories and protein intakes are 
quite substantial. 
Considered in this regard, it can be said that although rice is 
predominantly a subsistence crop, its contributions to national calories. 
and protein intake are sufficient to warrant some importance in any 
national food policy. 
2 2.2.6 Income to Household 
Income generation in the rural sector to reduce the income disparity 
between rural and urban levels is high in the government's priority. 
Table 2.10 shows that income levels in the agricultural sector are lowest 
compared to those in the other sectors. The Subsistence Agriculture 
category in the Table constitutes mainly Fijians. The rice growers would 
fall in between this category and the Corrunercial Agriculture category, but 
1 Chapter 4 will discuss this issue further. 
2 Having established. the predominantly subsistence nature of rice growing 
it may seem illogical to discuss the income accruing to rice farmers. 
Nevertheless, it is considered a prudent exercise particularly 
considering that commercial rice production from .irrigated farms is 
improving (see Table 2.7). Moreover, it does help in analysing the income 
rice growers are saving by not having to buy their own rice. 
Food Type 
Animal Products 
Cereals 
Pulses 
Root Vegetables 
Green Vegetables 
Other Vegetables 
Fruit 
Other 
TABLE 2.8 
TRADITIONAL RURAL DIETS 
Items Commonly Eaten 
by Fijians by Indians 
Fish1 , incl. shellfish 
Beef 
Pork 
Dalo (Taro) 
Cassava 
Sweet Potato 
Rourou (Taro Leaves) 
Be le 
Tomato 
Cucumber 
Bananas 
Pineapple 
Pawpaw 
Tea 
Coconut Milk 
Margarine or dripping 
Sugar 
Fish2 
Mutton 2 
Chicken 2 
2 Eggs 
Rice 
Ro ti 
Dhal 
Potato 
Okra 
Egg Plant 
Beans 
Cabbage 
Tomato 
Cucumber 
Bananas 
Pawpaw 
Oranges 
Lemons 
Tea 
Ghee 
Vegetable 
Spices 
Sugar 
oil 
Notes: l Traditionally fresh, but now canned fish is more common 
2 In small quantity 
Source: Sevehth Development Platt 
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Food Type 
TABLE 2.9 
SUMMARY OF AGGREGATE NATIONAL NUTRITIONAL 
l 
INTAKE, 1973-1974 
Calories (billion) Protein (million grams) 
Local Imports Local Local Imports Local 
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Product- less re- Consumpt-Product- less re- Consumpt-
Meat 
Fish 
Dairy Products 
Cereals 
imported 
Fruit 
Vegetables2 
Sugar Products 
Alcohol 
Coffee, Tea, 
Chocolate, 
Spices3 etc. 
Miscellaneous 
TOTAL 
Av. daily per
4 
capita intake 
ion less 
exports 
10.9 
2.1 
7.4 
13. 8 
125.4 
88.5 
248.l 
exports ion 
6.3 17.2 
6.4 8.5 
16.3 23.7 
152.l 152.l 
3.3 17.l 
12.3 137. 7 
2.2 90.7 
5.8 5.8 
1.6 1.6 
3.2 3.2 
209.5 457.6 
2,275 calories 
ion less exports ion 
exports 
719.5 438.4 1,157.9 
335.4 653.9 989.3 
244.0 428.l 672. l 
4,088.l 4,088.l 
218.5 41.l 259.6 
1,749.7 668.3 2,418.0 
79 . .0 3.1 82.l 
30.l 30.l 
2,726.3 2,726.3 
67.2 67.2 
3,346.l 9,144.6 12,490.7 
62 grams (of which 14 g. 
animal protein) 
Notes: 1 The method used carries with it the possibility of considerable 
errors. For example·, no stock carry over is accounted for and 
estimates of predominantly subsistence crops may be open to 
question. 
2 Including locally produced rice and pulses. 
3 In particular, spices used in curry powders which are a 
significant source of protein amongst the Indian community. 
4 Including tourists' intake. 
Source: Seventh Development Plan. 
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' ' 
tending more to the latter. In this regard, the Asian Development Bank 
(op cit, p.10} states that general observations tend to indicate that the 
incomes in outer islands and the interior of Viti Levu and Vanua Levu 
are far smaller than in the sugar growing areas. 
The above constitutes a general view of the situation. To study 
specifically some income estimates derived from rice production, the 
Gross Margins of Tables 2.3 and 2.4 can be of some use. The new Gross 
Margins of Table 2.3 when labour is accounted for is $70.80. These Gross 
Margins and the ones in the last two columns of Table 2. 4, i.e. $71. 00 and 
$49.00 represent, as established before, the returns to rice growers in 
the first and second categories of rice production system .. These Gross 
Margins represent the returns on fixed costs to the growers in these two 
categories. And it appears that these returns have decreased for .the 
average rice farms, i.e. $70.80 in 1975 to $49.00 in 1978. The returns on 
fixed costs on a rainfed rice farm with optimum conditions in 1978 is 
almost identical to the returns to an average farm three years previously. 
Table 2.11 shows the net returns to various rice farms under different 
conditions when a fixed cost, i.e. a reasonable land rent of $7.50 per 
acre, is accounted for. Again the net returns for a rainfed rice farin with 
average conditions seem to have declined over the years. Conclusions of 
similar comparative. nature for ther farm types in Table 2.11 cannot be 
reached for lack of earlier estimates. 
Taking the average farm size of one hectare, it could be calculated 
from Table 2.11 that the total net returns or total profit for a rainfed 
farm was about $156.00 in 1975. By 1978 this had somewhat declined for a 
farm with average conditions, i.e. it declined to about $102.00 per farm. 
For a farm with optimum conditions, the total profit in 1978 was about 
$157.00. 
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TABLE 2.10 
INCOMES OF LABOUR FORCE GROUPS, 1975 
Income Employment Income per Income per 
b . . 1 1 Su sistcncc Agricu turc 
Conunercial Agriculture 
Non-Agricultural wage & 
salary earners 
Non-Agricultural 
·entrepreneurial 
incomes 
Total or Average 
F$m (1000) 
42 27.1 
72 38.2 
155 68.8 
141 16.8 
410 150.9 
worker capita 
(F$) (P$) 
1,500 400 
1,890 490 
2,250 590 
8,390 2,180 
2, 720 710 
·Note: l It is not possible to make a comparable estimate for earlier 
years since 1975 is the only year for which an estimate of 
subsistence income and employment is available. 
Source: IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
The total profit estimates for irrigated farms in 1978 ranged from 
about $169.00 for average condition to about $236.00 per farm for optimum 
conditions. 
2.2.7 Employment Aspect 
Non-irrigated rice units in the cane area and those outside it almost 
alw~ys use family labour for these units are essentially smallholders. 
Even on irrigated units, family labour provides a sizeable proportion of 
the manpower requirement. 
The nllinber of rice growers in the country has somewhat declined, as 
noted earlier in Subsection 2.2.1. This decline reflects the general 
decline of the labour force in agriculture since 1956 as Table 2.12 
demonstrates. 
Farm Type 
Rainfed: 
TAJ3LE 2.11 
RETURNS PER ACRE ON FIXED COSTS AND 
NET RETURNS, 1975, 19781 
Gross Margins or Returns 
on Fixed Costs ($) Fixed 
Costs 
Net Returns 
1975 1978 +/- ( :? ) 1975 1978 
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($) 
+/-
average conditions 70.80 49.00 -21. 80 7.50 63.30 41. 50 -21. 80 
optimum conditions 70.80 71.00 + 0. 20 7.50 63.30 63.50 + 0.20 
Irrigated: 
average conditions 76.00 7.50 68.50 
optimum conditions 103. 00 7.50 95.50 
Note: 1 The figures in this Table are derived from Tables 2.3 and 2.4 
and from discussions based on them. They are, therefore on a 
per acre basis. 
As regards the employment content of a unit area of rice, Table 2.5 
does provide some information on manpower requirement on an irrigated rice 
farm. The total number of hours required of the farmer for a 6-month crop 
can be calculated from Table 2.5 and th~s amounts to 99 hours. Assuming 
a yield of 3.22 tonnes/ha (1.3 tons/ac) - see Table 2.7, and a price of 
$200/ton, it can be calculated that th~ gross proceed equals $260/ac, i.e. 
a net proceed of $130.80/ac. Expressed on a monthly basis, this is 
equivalent to $21.00 per acre per month. 
If, on the other hand, the farmer were to be employed ori a wage basis, 
he could earn in 99 hours (about 12.4 work days or 0.6 month) the equivalent 
of $62.37, i.e. assuming a Daily Mean Wage of $5.03 (see Table 2.6). 
Expressed on a monthly basis, this is equivalent to $104/month. Even if 
a relatively high 50% of this accounts for expenses, it can be seen that 
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TABLE 2.12 
. l' 
LABOUR FORCE IN AGRICULTURE, 
1956, 1966, 1973 and 1975 
Class of 1956 1966 1973 1975 
Agriculture 
'000 % '000 '000 % '000 % 
Mainly cash 28.l 30.5 41.8 34.7 38.4 26.8 38.2 25 
Mainly Subsistence 25.2 27.3 26.3 21. 8 26.3 18.4 27.1 18 
TOTAL 53.3 57.8 68.l 56.5 64.7 45.2 65.3 43 
Note: 1 Includes forestry and fisheries 
Source: IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
wage employment would still be the more lucrative. 
·This simple arithmetic highlights the situation that is so common on 
the two irrigation schemes in Rewa and Navua. That is, that farmers tend 
to be part-timers or absentee farmers who are employed elsewhere. 
Consequently, the management of their rice farms is affected. In the 
Western Division where tourism offers easy money, labour shortages which 
affect rice and sugar activities, have resulted {IBRD op cit, p.26). 
2.3 Other Marketing Aspects 
Subsistence rice still has to be milled and this is carried out in 
about 200 small mills that are dotted throughout the rice growing areas. 
These mills are owned by farmers and traders. The 1953 Colonial Annual 
report stated that these mills operated under capacity and produced 
substandard products. It is believed that the situation has not improved 
since then. 
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These mills do not have a constant throughput to allow economic 
operation. This is because rice growers keep paddy on their respective 
farms and only have them milled when required. The miller/trader may 
buy both paddy and milled rice which he sells from his store. Other 
middlemen, on the other hand, rnay'buy both from the farmer and the miller. 
There .are three commercially-operated large mills - two of which are 
in Nausori and one in Lautoka. The presence of many small rice mills, 
ap9-rt from the general subsistence nature of the crop, tends to constrain 
any. attempt at rationalization of r'ice marketing in Fiji. 
The marketing mar~ins represent the price spreads between producers 
and consumers. Table 2.13 shows these margins for the years in which both 
price series were available. 
From the Table, it can be seen that the proportion of returns to 
producers has been improving. However, the magnitude of the marketing 
TABLE 2.13 
RICE MARKETING MARGINS, 
1968, 1969, 1975, 1977 and 1978 
Year Producer Price Retail Price 
($/tonne) 
$/tonne 1 % 
'19.68 63.00 22 284.00 
1969 98.00 34 291 .. 00 
1975 ; 177. 00 41 '437.00 
1977 177 .00 49 364.00 
1978 177. 00 47 377. 00 
Note: 1 Percentage of producer price to Retail Price 
Sources: 1 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 
2 Bureau of Statistics 
Marketing 
Margins 
($/tonne) 
221.00 
193.00 
260.00 
187. 00 
200.00 
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margins seems to have no reflection at all of the simple marketing channel 
and the processes that actually take place between the producers and 
consumers 
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CHAPTER 3 
ANALYSIS OF RICE AND SUGAR CANE 
COMPETITIVENESS 
3.1 Preamble 
The hypothesis from Chapter l that the decline in rice area may be due 
. . f d ub . . l to competition rom sugar cane nee s s stantiation. 
This hypothesis has been popularly accepted over the years and is 
based on the following premises: 
(a) That the majority of rice farmers are also cane farmers 
as mentioned in the previous chapter. 
(b) That the majority of rice grown in Fiji is in the cane 
area as the same chapter reveals also. 
Occasions when this hypothesis has been cited or alluded to are numerous. 
Some of these are as follows: 
(a) The. Colonial Annual Report (1958) corrunented that the 
relatively high import of rice in that year was partly 
ascribed to a marked increase in land planted in cane 
over the last previous years in some areas where rice 
was grown before. 2 
l This, however, does ~ot necessarily preclude other factors that may 
contribute to the decline of the rice area. 
2 A somewhat reverse situation was observed between 1959 and 1962. Rice 
imports during this period declined (see Table 1.6), and this was partly 
due to a tariff imposition designed to offer protection to the local rice 
industry and to facilitate the establishment of a rice mill at Nausori. 
Whether the protection promoted both output and area of rice cannot be 
determined accurately. (although data in Tables 1.7 and 1.8 respectively 
indicate increases) because of substantial losses due to rice yellow in 
1959 and 1960 as mentioned in Chapter 1. Furthermore, it is also difficult 
to determine accurately whether the promotion of rice actually affected the 
sugar cane area which generally declined in the Western Division as will 
be seen in Table 3.1 
(b) The Department of Agriculture Annual Reports (1959, 1971 
and 1972) all mentioned the fact that when sugar cane 
harvesting season was prolonged, rice planting etc. by 
cane farmers would be delayed with consequent drop in rice 
area and production of rice from the cane area. This 
actually points out that the two commodities do not only 
compete for land, they also complete for the farmers' 
time on some occasions. 
(c) The Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Natural 
Resources and Population Trends of the Colony of Fiji 
1959 (Burn et al op cit) noted that cane had replaced 
rice on some of the better lartd. The report added that 
between 1956 and 1958, cane acreage increased by some 
13,200 acres, much of which formerly grew rice. 
(d) DP 7' (op cit, p.76) agreed that there is competition 
and remarked that a result of a healthy cane industry 
is the depressed state in the rice industry. 
3.2 Testing the Hypothesis 
3.2.1 Expectation of Inverse Relationship 
For two commodities to compete for limited resources, one must be 
finally favoured to the detriment of the other. In the case of rice 
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and sugar cane, it is usually assumed that they compete for land initially. 
Therefore, if cane for instance is favoured, its area will increase and 
that of rice will decrease. A priori, this is the inverse relationship 
that is expected between these two variables in both the Northern and 
Western Divisions. 
3.2.2 Limitations of Data 
Essential data to establish this inverse relationship, however, are 
not complete as ·Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 show. The data that are missing 
TABLE 3. l 
AREAS OF RICE AND SUGAR CANE, 
NORTHERN AND WESTERN DIVISIONS (ha) 
Northern Western Northern 
Year Year 
Cane Rice Cane Rice Cane Rice 
1952 6, 723 NA 33,309 NA 1967 11,383 NA 
1953 7,328 NA 33, 777 NA 1968 11,403 4,017 
1954 7,932 NA 35,046 NA 1969 11,417 NA 
1955 8,164 NA 35,675 NA 1970 11, 716 4,050 
1956 8,387 NA 37,239 NA 1971 11, 721 3, 774 
1957 8,894 NA 40,047 NA 1'972 11,798 3,715 
1958 9,141 NA 41, 770 NA 1973 11, 872 4,810 
1959 9,621 NA 44,681 NA 1974 12,791 4,600 
1960 9 ,672 NA 40,812 NA 1975 15,957 4,698 
1961 9,754 NA 41,040 NA 1976 16,204 4,124 
1962 9,878 NA 42,391 NA 1977 17,212 4,080 
1963 9,961 NA 42,174 NA 1978 18;443 NA 
1964 11,118 NA 42,345 NA 1979 19,201 NA 
1965 10,802 NA 47,390 NA 1980 21,168 NA 
1966 11,370 NA 49,910 NA 
Notes: NZ\ = Not l\.vailablc 
Sources: l. Fiji Sugar Corporation Limited 
2 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. 
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Western 
Cane. Rice 
50,454 NA 
50,606 3,587 
50,632 NA 
53,507 3,702 
53,530 2,471 
53,781 2,533 
53,951 2,190 
55,031 2,290 
57,753 2,760 
58,117 2,486 
60,150 2,300 
60,489 NA 
61,126 3,482 
64,230 NA 
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FIGURE 3.1 
GRAPHS OF RICE AND CANE AREAS 
IN NORTHERN AND WESTERN DIVISIONS 
1952-1980 1 
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(Western Division) 
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Rice Area (Western) 
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Note: 1. Graphs of rice areas in Northern and Western Divisions are not complete for the period studied due to unavailability of 
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are the rice areas that are considered most critical, i.e. those of the 
1950s and a substantial part of the 1960s that are likely to display a 
decline in values for that relatively longer period. Instead, we have 
the rice areas as from 1968. The late 1960s and the early 1970s are 
really the tail end of the period that we need to study in order to 
establish the inverse relationship. Moreover, the mid to late 1970s is 
really the period when some of government's efforts to increase the rice 
areas were being felt. 
The graphical revelation that was intended to conclusively establish 
this inverse relationship has, therefore, proved abortive. One has to 
resort to other means. 
3.2.3 Justification of the Inverse Relationship 
(a) The inverse relationship exists between the country's 
total rice areas and the country's sugar cane areas 
whether by division or by the total of the two 
divisions. Superimposition of Figures 1.2 and 3.1 will 
verify this. It can be implied, therefore, that taking 
the country as a whole, an increase in the cane area is 
certainly associated with a decline in the rice area. 
No casual relationship, however, can be established. 
Nevertheless, considering that the majority of rice is 
grown in the cane area by cane farmers, and that land is 
a limited resource amongst cane growers or in any other 
sector of agriculture for that matter, it can be said 
that if cane-is planted more extensively, then it may 
follow that rice has to be sacrificed. 
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(b) From Table 1. 8, it can be seen that the country's total rice 
area in 1968 was 10,118 hectares. Of these, the Northern 
Division had contributed about 40% and the Western Division 
3.5% (see Table 3.1). Assuming that these respective 
proportions existed a decade earlier also, it may be said 
that the Northern Division's rice area in 1958 was 5,051 
hectares (i.e. 0.4 x 12,627). Similarly, it can be said 
that the Western Division's rice area in the same year was 
4,419 hectares (i.e. 0.35 x 12,627). If these two values 
are then plotted on Figure 3.1, we may be able to depict 
the declining trend that characterized the rice areas 
·during this period. When these downward trends of the 
rice area are, in turn, compared to those upward graphs 
of the cane area already in Figure 3.1, we may then see 
the inverse relationship between the two commodities. 
(c) The essence of the historical observations discussed in 
Section 3.1 is that some of the increase in cane area was 
actually being planted on previous rice land. Since the 
cane areas have increased (see Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1) 
it can be inferred that some of this increase.would have 
been planted on rice land, and since there were no new 
rice schemes within the cane area, it can only be concluded 
that there would be an overall decline in rice area within 
the cane belt. 
3.3 Factors Contributing to the Inverse Relationship 
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A factor that definitely played a role to induce the inverse relation-
ship between areas of rice and sugar cane was the farmer's economic 
rationalization. He has his major cash crop in sugar cane which would 
account for most of his productive inputs and he would tend to grow the 
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maximum area allowable under his cane contract. 1 He would only grow 
sufficient rice, therefore, for his subsistence use. Any likely marketable 
surplus that is realized may only be incidental. 
The farmer's economic rationalization would make him respond positively 
to sugar cane prices. Table 3.2 shows that cane producer prices have 
tended to increase. Assuming price responsiveness, therefore, it can be. 
said that growers would adjust their relative crop areas accordingly with 
the likely increase in sugar cane area vis-a-vis rice area. 
TABLE 3.2 
SUGAR CANE PRODUCER PRICES, 1958-1975 
Year F$/tonne Year F$/tonne 
1958 6.80 1967 6.23 
1959 6.33 1968 6.40 
1960 7.20 1969 6.62 
1961 6.31 1970 7.62 
1962 6.88 1971 7.95 
1963 9.64 1972 9.90 
1964 7.08 1973 9.76 
1965 6.59 1974 20.57 
1966 6.39 1975 31.60 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
l Cane growers and the Fiji Sugar Corporation, FSC, have 10-year contracts 
to cover each other's interests and, inter alia, the contract provides 
for a formula of sharing of proceeds. Independent arbitrators who have 
set the contract terms in the past are Britain's Sir Malcolm Eve (later 
Lord Silsoe) and a British judge, Lord Denning. Cane growers are 
essentially smallholders. The system of smallholder cane farming started 
after 1916 when the indenture system ·ended. Prior to that, Fiji's sugar 
cane was grown on the plantation system. 
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It may be argued that farmer's economic rationalization may actually 
phase out subsistence rice. This is valid where the farmer has an 
alternative source of relatively cheap rice; and some growers do in fact 
have access to an alternative source, as will be apparent below. Generally 
speaking, however, growers tend to retain an area of their land for 
subsistence cropping for whatever economic or non-economic reasons they 
feel are i~portant. Moreover, farmers are cognizant of the savings that 
accrue to them when they grow their staple food which they would otherwise 
buy from elsewhere. 
This apparent saving is really what the farmers perceive and associate 
with rice. In other words, they do not associate the commodity with 
relative profitability of rice and sugar cane cultivation. Even if they 
do, they are likely to see that rice farming is less profitable vis-a-vis 
sugar cane cultivation. For instance an average sugar cane farmer 
producing 35 tons of cane and selling at the current $25/ton will gross 
$875/acre and net $525/acre i.e. assuming a reasonable 40% production 
costs. For a 12-month season, the net profit is equivalent to $43.75/month. 
The same farmer may grow an acre of rice and he is likely to gross about 
$140 in a 6-month season, i.e. assuming a yield of 0.7 ton/ac (equivalent 
to 1.7 tonnes/ha from Table 2.2) and a price at the current level of 
l $200/ton. On a monthly basfs, this gross proceed is equivalent to about 
$23.33; and even this estimate of the gross proceed does not compare 
well to the estimate of the net proceed from the same area of sugar cane. 
Apart from this intrinsic rationalization of the farmer, there are 
extrinsic influences that tend to militate against expansion of rice and 
l If he were to forego growing rice completely and expect to buy all his 
rice requirements then he would certainly pay more than this after 
marketing margins have been taken into account (see Table 2.13). 
have therefore contributed to its areal decline. These are: 
(a) The sugar industry's existing infrastructures in the 
forms of mills, extension service, transport network, 
guaranteed. outlet, prices/returns certainties, 
provisions of inputs, contractual arrangements etc., 
all contribute to the attractiveness of sugar cane 
farming. These in themselves, however, do not 
necessarily militate against rice farming. What does 
militate against rice is really the relative absence 
of these similar infrastructures in the rice industry. 
Had they been available, rice farming would have been 
increasingly commercialized and its area might have 
actually increased or remained constant rather than 
decreased. 
(b) The Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC) and its predecessors 
have always maintained and promoted monoculture. Rice 
in particular was not encouraged. This, however, was 
not implemented directly in that farmers were not told 
to grow rice. Instead, FSC instituted a scheme whereby 
cheap rice was sold to cane farmers and this replaced 
what farmers would have grown themselves. 
In this capacity, the Colonial Sugar Refining Company Ltd. 
(CSR), as FSC was then, established the Rewa Rice Ltd 
to proviue this role. The Rcwa Rice Ltd is now an 
independent government agency but it is still continuing 
this role apart from its other roles to the other sectors 
of the economy. However, its role to the cane farmers 
may not be as extensive as it used to be. 
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(c) "Backyard" sugar cane farming was promoted from about 1975 
to 1979. This was done to boost sugar production which 
was declining at that time and farms less than 15 acres, 
which would normally be excluded for contractual arrange-
ments, were given contracts to grow cane. Some of these 
small farms within the cane area that would normally 
1 have rice were subsequently planted to sugar cane. 
The rice areas both in the Western and Northern Divisions 
experienced marked declines in 1976 and 1977, as can be 
seen in Table 3.1. 
With the termination of this scheme on 31st March, 1979, 
it would be reasonable to assume that rice area may 
2 increase again within the cane belt. However, the 
possibilities of this reversing the long-term trend 
as depicted in Figure 1.2 are uncertain. 
3.4 Rice Acreage Response Study 
The inconclusiveness of the graphical method to establish the inverse 
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relationship between areas of rice and cane lends validity and justification 
for this approach. However, the results below are based on poor data and 
tenuous assumptions .and care must be exercised in deriving implications 
from such results. 
Single and multivariate regression models are used here and, essentially, 
the objective is to study the rice acreage response in relation to some of the 
major variables including the area of sugar cane. 
1 Between 1976 and 1979, 1,040 backyard contracts involving 5,544 acres and 
79,210 tonnes were issued (Fiji Sugar Industry Annual Report for 1979 
Season, p.7). 
2 Obviously, there would be a delay of three or four years for all cane ratoons 
to be harvested before there is any· ·re la ti vely marked increase in the rice 
area. 
3.4.1 The Model 
The model to be estimated is as follows: 
A f(A 
c' 
p , p ) 
r c r 
(3.1) 
where, A rice area 
r 
A cane area 
c 
p 
c 
price of cane 
p price of rice 
r 
The regressand, A , has been declining as we see in Table 1.8 and 
r 
Figure 1.2. The first regressor, A , is considered the most important 
c 
since we are attempting to establish the competition between rice and 
cane. Its significantly-increasing values from 1947 to 19751 are 
contained in Table 3.3. 
The values of the next regressor, P , is also shown in the Table. 
c 
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A proxy is being used instead of producer prices for three reasons. Firstly, 
the producer price series in Table 3.2 was not complete. Secondly, the 
proxy is considered quite appropriate because of its high correlation to 
the producer price series of Table 3.2 - where r = (+) 0.95. Thirdly, 
the proxy is also considered appropriate since Fiji exports most of her 
raw sugar to UK. It is expected that cane farmers who are rice farmers 
also would be price responsive as far as price of cane is concerned .. 
The third regressor, P , is included to complete the model. Again a 
r 
proxy is used for lack of rice producer prices. On a priori grounds, 
the expected relationship between A and P is uncertain since farmers 
r r 
are not quite commercial rice producers and the rationale for production 
may include non-economic considerations. 
1 A simple time trend analysis results in the following: 
A = -2371383 + 1226* T where T = Time, r 2 = 0.93. 
c 
It should be noted also that national data are being used rather than 
divisional data which would be more appropriate, but were, unfortunately, 
not complete for the period to be studied. 
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TAl3LE 3.3 
VALUES OF THE REGRESSORS USED IN THE 
RICE ACREAGE RESPONSE STUDY 
Year 1 Cane Area Price of Price of 
rice 5 
(US¢/Kg) 
Year Cane Area 
(ha) 
Price of Price of 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
(ha) cane3 
16,949 
18,000 
18,000 
18,176 
16,930 
21,360 
24,672 
23,586 
24,762 
23,420 
25,735 
31,119 
35,518 
30,861 2 
31,104 
(US¢/Kg) 
6.3(E) 
7.0(E) 
7.7(E) 
8.4 
9.1 
10.6 
11. 7 
11. 3 
11.2 
11. 6 
11.6 
12.1 
12.4 
12.2 
12.4 
17.4(E) 1962 
15.0(E) 1963 
12.6 1964 
10.2 1965 
10.0 1966 
10.7 1967 
9.9 1968 
15.9 1969 
14.1 1970 
13.8 1971 
13.9 1972 
14.8 1973 
13. 3 1974 
12.5 1975 
13. 7 
31,347 
31,347 
34,992 
36,693 
43,000 
45,000 
46,000 
47,000 
46,000 
47,000 
44,000 
46,000 
45,000 
45,000 
cane rice 
(US¢/Kg) (US¢/Kg) 
12.6 
12.7 
12.7 
11.6 
12.0 
11. 8 
10.3 
10. 3 
10.3 
10.6 
12.2 
12.1 
32.54 
35.0 
15.3 
14.4 
13. 7 
13. 7 
16.6 
22.2 
20.3 
18.4 
14.3 
12.9 
14.8 
29.9 
53 .4 
54.1 
Notes: 1 Area harvested 
Sources: 
2 The 1960-1965 area series has been revised to account for 
unharvested cane 
3 UK Import Price of raw sugar 
4 The 1974 and 1975 sugar prices shown are derived from Fiji 
export unit value 
5 Thailand Export prices of milled rice 
E Extrapolated values 
1 Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978 
2 Colonial Annual Reports, 1947-1973 
3 IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
4 Annual Statistical Abstract, 1969-1971 
5 Department of Agriculture Annual Reports, 1959, 1966''-1972 
6 Burn et al (1960) 
7 FAO Production Yearbook 
8 FAO Trade Yearbook 
9 FAO Rice Reports 
10 FAO Commodity Reports 
3.4.2 Results of Estimation 
Simple Linear and Simple Logarithmic Regressions were carried out 
at first. An additional regressor in the form of the relative price of 
rice to cane, P /P , was included in the regressions in the event that 
r c 
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this might have more impact on the ·regressand vis-a-vis the absolute prices. 
The results show that of all the regressors, only A (area of cane) 
c 
had regression coefficients that were statistically significant in both 
regressions, e.g., 
Simple Linear Regression 
The model estimated was: 
A 
r 
where, a. 
l 
b. 
l 
a. + b.X. 
l l l 
constant 
regression coefficient 
x. 
l 
represents each of the regressors in 
model 3.1, including P /P the relative 
r · c 
price regressor 
i 1;2,3,4. 
Significant Regressor A (area of cane) 
c 
bl -0.19* 
SE 0.05 
.2 
0.39 r 
F 17.22* 
DW 1.18 
(3.2) 
Simple Logarithmic Regression 
The model estimated was: 
A 
r 
a. + b.lnX. 
l l l 
where, a. constant 
l 
b. regression coefficient 
l 
X. = represents each of the regressors in 
l 
model 3.1, including P /P the relative 
r c 
price regressor 
i 1,2,3,4. 
Significant Regressor A 
c 
(area of cane) 
bl -0.53* 
SE 0.19 
2 0.23 r 
F 7.85* 
DW 1.22 
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( 3. 3) 
The coefficients have the expected sign i.e. indicating an inverse· 
relationship. The Linear Regression coefficient implies that if there is a 
1% increase in the area of cane, there would be a 0.19% decrease in the 
area of ~ice, ceteris ~aribus_. The elasticity of such a response is about 
0.53 as indicated by the Logarithmic Regression coefficient. 
The test for autocorrelation, however, remains inconclusive as 
indicated by.the Durbin-Watson Statistics (DW). This in itself indicates 
the need for more observations. 
Because of the ceteris paribus assumptions inherent in the two 
regressions above, the results may not reflect the true situation. The 
results of a multivariate regressions (see below) attempt to depict the 
true situation, e.g. 
Results of the Step-wise Multiple Linear Regression 
The models estimated were: 
A 
r 
A 
r 
A 
r 
a 3 + b A + b 7P /P 6 c r c 
(3.4) 
(3. 5) 
(3.6) 
where, a 1 , a 2 , a 3 
are constants· 
1. 
2. 
3. 
b - b are regression coefficients whose values with their 1 7 
respective standard errors (in parentheses) are 
tabulated below: 
A p p p /P '.R2 F DW 
c c r r c 
-0.20* 8.8 15.9 0. 39 5.39* 1.18 
(0.05) (194) (114) 
-0.20* 20.4 o. 39 8.41* 1.18 
(0.05) ( 53) 
-0.19* 309 0.39 8.36* 1.18 
(0.05) (1111) 
The signs of the significant regression coefficients of A are as 
c 
expected and are consistent. The magnitude seems consistent also. The 
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2 ( . . d h 2 . df .. R 0.39) did not improve compare to t e r obtaine or the Simple Linear 
Regression, when A was the only regressor. This implies that the addition 
c 
of other regressors to the regression did not perceptibly add to the 
variation of the rcgressand. This may underline the dominance of the cane 
area as a factor in the variation of the rice area. 
There were no statistically significant regressions for the step-wise 
Multiple Logarithmic version of the regression. However, the A coefficients 
c 
(elasticities) themselves were significant, they had the expected signs and 
were consistent in magnitude. The three estimates obtained were -0.60(0.24), 
-0.60 (0.23) and -0.53(0.19). 
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The severity of multicollinearity was gradu~lly reduced as the step-
wise regression progressed. The problem was still too severe to be 
neglected. This was demonstrated by either the R2 being less than the 
correlation coefficient (r) of any two regressors in the same regression, 
or by the standard error (SE) being greater than its corresponding 
regression coefficient. Given this situation, therefore, it can be said 
that the estimates of the regression coefficient and the elasticity are 
inefficient i.e. the estimates obtained by applying the OLS regression 
process to different samples would differ from one another by a smaller 
amount than the estimates produced by other methods. 
The test for autocorrelation still remains inconclusive indicating 
again the need for more observations. 
Despite these statistical inconsistencies, we may still arrive at the 
statement that the cane area appears to be a major factor in the variation 
of the rice area; and if the cane area is increased, it appears that the 
rice area will decrease as a result. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANALYSIS OF INCREASING RICE IMPORTS 
4.1 Preamble 
The rationale for imports in Fiji's .context and how rice featured in 
the import figures were discussed in Chapter 1. This chapter looks at the 
past trend of rice import statistics and discusses some of the salient 
factors that have contributed to this trend. 
4.2 Empirical Observation 
Table 1.6 and Figure 1.1, as noted previously, show that the quantity 
of rice imports has tended to increase since 1948. The increase, however, 
has not been one of continuous upward escalation. Nevertheless, a simple 
time trend analysis of import data from 1948 to 1975 shows that there had 
been a significant upward trend. The result of the simple time trend 
analysis is as follows: 
Rice Import 
2 
where r 
T 
-1042787 + 535* T 
0.82 
Time variable. 
4.3· Factors That Bring About Increasing Rice Imports 
4.3.1 Stagnation of Local Rice Production 
The stagnation of local agricultural production, with the exception 
of sugar cane was discussed in Chapter 1. The stagnation of local rice 
production is depicted in Figure 1.1 also. This particular figure shows 
that the graphs depicting local rice production and imported rice have 
tended to converge over the years and have actually crossed path. In 
other words, whilst prior to the 1970s the quantity of imported rice used. 
to be less than local rice production, during the 1970s and particularly 
in the second half of the,decade, the situation had reversed. 
Two other observations can be derived from this same diagram. The 
first is of a short-term nature whilst the other is of a'long-term one. 
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In the short-term, if annual data are analysed, it can be seen that 
in some years the quantity of rice imports varies inversely as the quantity 
of locgl rice produced e.g. in 1951, 1952, 1953 etc. 
The year 1951 was unusually dry, and this delayed rice planting. 
Consequently, rice production fell and rice imports increased. Rice 
production was further depressed the following year due both to drought 
and to hurricane damage. This further increased the quantity of rice 
imports. However, in 1953 Fiji realized a good harvest and the quantity 
of imported rice consequently fell. 
In some other years, this inverse relationship was absent. Apart from 
a delayed response in the demand for rice imports, a factor that may explain 
such absence, it can also be implied that there are other factors that may 
need to be considered to explain the increase in the quantity of rice 
imports. 
The long-term observation that can be derived from Figure 1.1 tends to 
confirm the existence of other factors. The fact that the two graphs are 
not diametrically opposed to each other establishes that the relationship 
between the two variables is not one of a 'complete inverse and that other 
factors must be considered to produce .the relationship so depicted in the 
diagram. 
4.3.2 Increasing Population and Drbanization1 
Population and increased urbanization may be two of these factors. 
The population statistics in Table 4 .1 depict increases both in the tota.l 
and in the raciai components of the population. The total population data 
1 These two factors are treated jointly here because of their similar effects 
on demand for rice. Whilst the former affects the total demand for rice, 
the latter affects especially the demand for imported rice. This, howeve.r, 
will become more apparent later. 
Year 
1947 
1948 
1949 
1950 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
TABLE 4.1 
FIJI POPULATION AND MAIN 
RACIAL COMPONENTS, 1947-19761 
Fijian 
( 'OOO) 
148 
202 
260 
Indian 
( 1000) 
169 
241 
293 
Others 
( '000) 
29 
35 
35 
Total 
( '000) 
269 
277 
285 
289 
302 
313 
321 
333. 
345 
346 
361 
374 
388 
394 
407 
421 
435 
449 
464 
478 
490 
495 
506 
521 
533 
544 
556 
565 
576 
588 
Note: l Years that have population figures for the main population 
components are the population census years. 
Sources: 1. Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978 
2. Annual Statistical Abstract,. 1969-1971 
3. Colonial Office Annual Reports, 1947-1973 
4. Report on the Census of the Population 1976, Volume 1. 
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have a high positive correlation r = + 0.91) with rice import data 
(vide Figure 4.1). That is that high rice import requirement is associated 
with high population figure and vice versa. Any causal relationship, 
however, can only be implied. 
That increased population may be causing increased demand for 
imported rice may be better analysed if the racial components of Fiji's 
population are studied. 
The Indian population, be they rural or urban, are the main rice eaters 
(vide SUbsection 2.1.5). Their number has been increasing as shown in 
Table 4.1 and Figure 4,1. It can be assumed, therefore, that their demands· 
for rice have also increased proportionately. However, it remains to be. 
seen whether this 1ncreased demand would actually increase the demand for 
imported rice. 
It is proposed here that the increase both in the Indian and Fijian 
population has contributed to the increased demand for imported rice for 
the following reasons: 
(a) Fiji's urban population has been increasing (vide Table 4.2 
below) . 
FIGURE 4.1 
GRAPHS OF RICE IMPORTS AND 
TOTAL POPULATION, 1947-1979 
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TABLE 4.2 
RURAL/URBAN POPULATION DISTRIBUTION, 1966 and 1976 
( '000) 
Class of 1966 1976 AGR (%) 
Population 
No. % No. % 1966-76 
Rural 317.5 66.6 370.0 62.8 1. 5 
Urban 159.3 33.4 218.5 37.2 3~2 
TOTAL 1 476.8 100 588.5 100 2.1 
Note: 1 Subject to rounding error 
Source: Country Review Paper, 1978. 
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It can be reasonably assumed, therefore, that both Indian and Fijian 
urban population are increasing proportionately. Moreover, it is 
generally believed that urban dwellers prefer polished, imported 
rice to local, unpolished rice. 1 Therefbre, it ~an be concluded 
that increased Indian urban population has contributed to increased 
demand for imported rice. 
(b) Fijians also have developed a taste for rice (vide Parkinson op cit, 
p.86). In Table 4.3, it can be seen that urban Fijian consumption 
of cereal products, which admittedly included bread, is not very 
far behind the corresponding figure for Indians. 
1 Two major reasons for this preference are known. Firstly, urban 
consumers tend to develop sophisticated tastes for "better" 
quality and imported commodities. Secondly, local rice is 
relatively less available in urban areas since the majority of 
the rice grown in Fiji is for subsistence (vide Chapter 2) and, 
therefore, does not get to markets. 
TABLE 4.3 
FORTNIGHTLY URBAN EXPENDITURE ON RICE AND 
ROOTCROPS 1 IN PERCENTAGES BY RACE 
Fijian Indian Chinese European 
Bakery products, 
cereals 
Root Crops 
5.4 
4.4 
6.1 
0.8 
2 9.1 
0.7 
4.8 
1. 5 
Notes: 1 Corresponding figures for rootcrops are 
included for comparison 
2 This figure seems high. It is most likely 
that rice purchases by some restauranteurs 
are included. 
Source: Report on the Urban Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey in Fiji, 1972. 
An urban Fijian would also buy more imported rice than 
local rice, like his Indian counterpart, for reasons 
stated earlier. 
A rural Fijian is likely to be consuming more rice also. 
Parkinson (ibid, p.89) explains that a subsistence Fijian 
farmer turned cash cropper, a trend that is increasing, 
does not have time to grow enough food for subsistence 
use. He, therefore, would buy the available convenience 
foods (e.g. rice) since he has the cash. Despite his 
rural setting, it would be reasonable to assume that he 
would be buying imported rice increasingly. 
There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, the store 
where he would purchase his rice, would be obtaining its 
stock from an urban centre. Therefore, there would be 
more likelihood for imported rice to be stocked in lieu 
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of local rice. Secondly, since the majority of rice 
farmers are Indians (vide Chapter 2), a rural Fijian 
consumer would be less accessible to local rice vis-a-vis 
his Indian counterpart. 
(c) Per capita rice consumption has been increasing over 
the years. Table 4.4 shows this trend. Since the 
figures shown are urban-biased, it could be implied that 
the consumption so estimated would be based mainly on 
imported rice. 
TABLE 4.4 
ESTIMATED RICE CONSUMPTION 
PER HEAD OF POPULATION, 1968-19771 
Year Kilograms 
1968 49 
1969 50 
1970 52 
1971 54 
1972 54 
1973 59 
1974 72 
1975 56 
1976 54 
1977 64 
Note: l Stock fluctuation is not accounted for. Therefore data reflect 
only apparent consumption. 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
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4.3.3 Increasing Per Capita Income 
Table 4.5 shows that per capita income has certainly been increasing 
over the years. It appears, therefore, that per capita income and per capita 
rice consumption in Table 4.4 have a high positive correiation·i.e. high per 
capita income is associated with high per capita rice consumption. Without 
resorting to a rigorous statistical test for causation of this relationship, 
it can be implied, ceteris paribus, that rice is far from an inferior good. 
The fact that urban Indians and Fijians, who are relatively wealthy vis-a-vis 
their rural counterparts, are still consuming rice increasingly, may verify 
this remark. 
TABLE 4.5 
PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1968-1977 
·Year GDP GDP/head General GDP/head 
(F$m) ($) CPI ($) 
(cu·rrent prices) (current prices) Base Year (constant prices) 
Jan'74=100 
1968 129.6 262 62.6 419 
1969 140.5 278 64.9 428 
1970 168.9 324 67.6 479 
1971 184.7 347 72.0 482 
1972 230.5 424 78.6 539 
1973 300.6 541 87.4 619 
1974 400.0 708 108.6 652 
1975 502.4 872 122.8 710 
1976 558.5 955 136.8 698 
1977 636.2 1067 146.4 729 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
The observation above is based on time-series data contained in Tables 
4.4 and ~.5. The results derived from cross-sectional data (see Table 4.6) 
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and their implications on rice consumption habits are indeed very interesting. 
The Table implies that in Fiji society, at any point in time, less 
wealthy persons will spend proportionately more of their income on rice 
vis-£-vis their more affluent count~rparts. 
Assuming that this consumption pattern is valid and, furthermore, that 
rice per capita consumption is also increasing, then it can be implied that 
a substantial proportion of Fiji's urban rice consumers are in the lower 
income group. Table 4.7 gives an example of income distribution in Fiji's 
context. 
TABLE ,4. 6 
EXPENDITURE ON RICE AND ROOTCROPS IN 
PERCENTAGES BY QUARTILE INCOME GROUPS 1 
Bakery products, cereals 
(rice) 
Rootcrops 
1st 
7.7 
3.5 
2nd 
6.8 
2.5 
3rd 4th 
6.9 5.2 
1.8 1. 5 
Note: 1 corresponding figures for rootcrops ,are included for comparison. 
Source: Report on the Urban Household. Income and Expenditure Survey in 
Fiji, 1972. 
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+ABLE 4.7 
INCOME GROUPS BY QUARTILES BY RACEl 
Ql Q2 Q3 Q4 
Indians 66(24) 69(25) 77(28) 65 (23) 
Fijians 36(32) 35(31) 24(21) 18(16) 
Chinese 4(24) 3(18) 5(29) 5 (29) 
Europeans 4(H) 4 (11) ') ( 13) 2') (6'J) 
Notes: l Figures outside parenthesis refer to number of income earners. 
Those in parenthesis represent their respective percentages 
to the total of earners in each race. 
Source: Report on the Urban Household Income and Expenditure Survey 
in Fiji, 1972. 
4.3.4 Domestic Supply and Demand Conditions 
Prices of local rice are.invariably higher than those of imported rice 
(see Table 4.8). On the subject of the usually inflated prices Fiji farmers 
tend to demand, Burn said that 
" ...... it is our view that many farmers have an 
inflated idea as to the prices they should receive 
for their produce .... " 
(Burn et al op cit, p.50). This situation has somewhat persisted ever since. 
Given such a situation where prices of imported rice are cheaper 
relative to those of local rice, in addition to the special preference for 
imported rice in the urban areas, it is conceivable that demands for imported 
rice would increase. 
4.3.5 International Supply and Demand Conditions 
Fiji is a price taker in the world rice market. Import price of rice 
on its own, therefore, is not a major factor in the decision to import. 
Thailand export price of milled rice is taken as a proxy for Fiji's price of 
imported rice. Its values are tabulated in Table 4.9 and graphed in Figure 
TABLE 4.8 
RETAIL PRICES OF IMPORTED AND LOCAL 
l 
RICE, SUVA MARKET 
(¢/Kg) 
Date Imported Local 
28/1/79 55 51 
21/3/79 48-55 51-59 
18/4/79 48-55 51-55 
2/5/79 48-55 51-62 
6/6/79 48-55 55-62 
4/7/79 44-48 51-59 
8/8/79 44-51 53-62 
12/9/79 44-51 55-62 
10/10/79 44-51 55 
28/11/79 48 44 
5/12/79 48 44 
30/1/80 55 60 
6/2/80 55 60 
30/4/80 55-57 60 
7/5/80 55-57 60 
9/7/80 55-57 60 
6/8/80 55-57 60 
Note: l The situation that imported rice has been cheaper vis-a-vis 
local rice has been the case for years. For instance, the 
situation existed in 1975 and 1976, and it was one of the 
reasons that motivated the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fisheries (MAP) to propose for a rice tariff which Cabinet 
refused. However, MAF persisted in its efforts to protect 
the local rice industry and was rewarded in 1978 to impose 
rice import licensing. 
Source: Department of Agriculture Weekly Market News, 1979-1980. 
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TABLE 4.9 
PRICES OF IMPORTED RICE 1949-1975 
Year US¢/Kg l Year US¢/Kg 
1949 12.6 1963 14 .. 4 
1950 10.2 1964 13. 7 
1951 10.0 1965. 13. 7 
1952 10.7 1966 16.6 
1953 9.9 1967 22.2 
1954 15.9 1968 20.3 
1955 14.1 1969 18.4 
1956 13.8 1970 14.3 
1957 13.9 1971 12.9 
1958 14.8 1972 14.8 
1959 13. 3 1973 29.9 
1960 12.5 1974 53.4 
1961 13. 7 1975 54 .. 1 
1962 15.3 
Note: 1 Thailand Export price of milled rice is taken as a 
representative import price. 
Source: FAO Production Yearbook (nd) 
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4.2. If this figure is superimposed on Figure 4.1, it will be noted that 
the quantity of imported rice would tend to increase as its prices 
increase. This only establishes the fact that when Fiji needs to import 
rice, it will do so despite the relatively high prices that may be prevailing 
at that time. 
4.3.6 Fiji's Exchange Rate 
The increased prices of imports in the latter part of the period studied 
in Figure 4.2 have contributed to increased values of imports. The real 
value of imports can be expressed in a function such as: 
where, Z 
y 
p 
IT 
Z = Z -( Y 1 p I IT) 
real value of imports 
domestic income 
price level (commodity price level in this case) 
exchange rate 
That is, the real value of imports is assumed to be an increasing function 
of domestic income and the price level( and a decreasing function of the 
exchange rate. Discussions on the effects of Y and p have been done in 
subsections 4.3.3 and 4.3.4 respectively. 
As regards IT, this would have to appear to decrease for import demand 
to increase, i.e. imports cost less in local currency than previously. This 
constitutes an overvaluation of the exchange rate. And if there is no 
devaluation of the local currency demand for imports will tend to increase. 
4.3.7 State Intervention 
In most developing countries and even in some of the developed capital-
istic countries, there has been an increasing trend for greater state 
intervention. Fiji is no exception. 
FIGURE 4.2 
GRAPH OF PRICES OF RICE IMPORTS 
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Government interventions have been in the following forms: 
(a) Supply restriction (including imported rice) in 1949. 
Sale was restricted to Indians only. This, however, gave 
rise to black markets and the restriction was later 
lifted. 
(b) Imposition of tariffs on rice imports between 1959 to 1962. 
This was instituted to offer protection for the establish-
ment of a rice mill at Nausori. During this period~ rice 
imports were effectively reduced (vide Figure 4.1) 1 . 
(c) Licensing of rice imports in 1978. This, however, does 
not appear to be effectively making imported rice dearer 
vis-a-vis local rice i.e. on a consistent basis (see 
Table 4.8). 
(d) Infrastructures. These include the establishment of 
large-scale irrigation schemes~ small drainage schemes, 
Rewa Rice Ltd, the Drainage and Irrigation Division and 
the Seed Testing Laboratory. 
All these interventions except (a) had been instituted to discourage 
rice imports. For rice imports to appear to be increasing is a testimony 
of the lack of success of these interventions. However, as noted in 
Chapter 1, government policies can be frustrated by a host of factors, be 
they expected or not. Chapter 6 will attempt to discuss this particular 
aspect. 
1 See Appendix 3.1 for the mechanism of how imports are reduced using 
General Equilibrium Analysis. 
5.1 Preamble 
CHAPTER 5 
ANALYSIS OF PAST AND PROJECTED TRENDS OF 
SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR RICE IN FIJI 
Forecasting of long term (five to twenty years) trends together 
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with the underlying growth prospects are conventionally referred to as 
projections. 1 The relatively longer time-span allows for the implementation, 
of new policies which may be required, for instance, to correct adverse 
trends. 
Projections attempt to show likely trends and developments in 
commodity markets based on certain stated assumptions about production, 
consumption etc., over some planning horizon. Projections, then, should 
follow rigorously and determinately from the models. which are used to 
produce them. The assumptions made a:Qout determining variables in such 
models are then explicitly related to the projections produced using those 
assumptions. 
There may arise cases of individual commodities where no attempt is 
made to predict or forecast the most likely values of the determining 
variables. In such a situation, projections should incorporate explicit 
statements, for example, about the particular price policies considered or 
the demand levels used according to varying assumed income growth .rates. 
These underlying assumptions.need.to be explicitly stated. Only then is 
it possible to present reasoned approximations to both theory and reality 
which are necessary in making projections. 
Demand and supply projection should be a sc~entific and logical 
exercise in determining supply and demand in the longer term using a 
1 For a simple discussion.of what forecasting is about, see Sawers 1977, p.2. 
reasoned set of assumptions about the determining variables which are 
considered relevant. 
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Projections of important economic quantities are indispensable for 
development and or perspective planning. However, present projection 
techniques are less than perfectly reliable (Sawers 1977, p.5) and 
economists are forced to make often extensive improvisations to produce 
projections. 
This chapter attempts to project supply and demand for rice to 1985, 
given the existing policies, and to study the relative trends of supply 
and demand in order to judge the effectiveness or otherwise of the Food 
Self-Sufficiency Policy. If the supply and demand trends are diverging 
over the years, then this would indicate the £ailure of efforts to increase 
production proportionately more than demand, or to slow the growth of demand 
vis-a-vis supply, which a Food Self-Sufficiency Policy aims to do. In such 
a case of divergent trends, a Food Self-Sufficiency Policy may be regarded 
as ineffective. Where trends are conve.rgent or tend to converge, however, a 
Food Self-Sufficiency Policy may be regarded as effective. 
5.2 Choice of Models for Projections 
Sophisticated econometric multiple regression models were initially 
considered for this study. However, their results, on the whole; were 
inconsistent and statistically inaefensible. Consequently, they were found 
unreliable for meaningful projections and for analysing other related 
objectives, e.g. structural analysis and policy evaluation (vide Koutsoyiannis 
1977 for discussions of these objectives). Both the quality and quantity of 
the data were found to be the principal constraints. 
Subsequently, the use of such models was restricted only to the supply 
projections. Such statistical and econometric prerequisites, e.g. conformity 
of signs and magnitude of coefficients to a priori expectations, stability 
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and predictive power of the regression equations we.re violated, merely to 
get a series of projected data whic0 may closely approximate reality.· Two 
statistical prerequisites that were ensured, however, were a high R2 and 
the absence of autocorrelation. The former ensures the goodness of fit of the 
relevant variables to the multiple regression model. The latter is equally 
important in that the independent variables, being time-series data, are 
likely to be autocorrelated. If autocorrelation is not removed, then the 
projected value is also likely to be autocorrelated (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
1976, p.178). This would give rise to biased estimates when using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimation method. The results of this attempt 
will be discussed later in comparison to the results of simpler projection 
methods discussed below. 
Perhaps the most widely used technique for agricultural projections 
is the technique of simple extrapolation. The simplest method of extra-
polation is the time trend method which correlates a single variable, say 
production, with discrete time intervals as follows: 
or, 
QiT = f(T) 
Q = a + bT iT 
(5.1.) 
(5. 2) 
where Q. =output of the ith variable in the discrete time interval, T. 
iT . 
The time trend method is often used in exponential form when projecting 
production. The functional form to be used is derived from the exponential 
growth curve: 
rT 
YT= f(T) = Ae 
which, in logarithmic form, is represented as: 
lnyT lnA + rTlne 
i.e. lnyT lnA + 
or, lnyT a + bT 
or, lnQT = a + bT 
for the purpose of this analysis. 
rT where 
where 
(5:3) 
(5.4) 
lne l (5. 5) 
a lnA 
b - r 
(5.6) 
80 
The exponential growth curve assumes that a series, say QT, grows 
with constant perc,entage increases, rather than constant absolute increases. 
In the time trend f_ormulation, it is assumed that the rate of change 
of growth or decline of a particular variable would continue according 
to the rate that has been observed in the past. In general the correlation 
of economic phenomenon with time is devoid of any economic meaning except 
to the extent that whatever has been the interrelationship of the economic 
forces in the past, that same interrelationship is projected into the 
future. Such a proposition is somewhat tautological and does not contribute 
to analysis of the interrelationships. 
On the credit side, the data requirements of the time trend method 
are absolutely minimal. The virtue of the method lies in its simplicity 
and the ease with which it can be subjectively updated to give more 
'reasonable' projections. It is essentially the method used by OECD 
(1968) and FAO (1970, 1971); and the same method is used in this study for 
projections of supply of rice. 
As regards projections of demand, a simple linear time trend model 
of the form of equation 5.2 was used. Moreover, another simple extra-· 
polation technique, the correlation with GNP method was also used. This 
method consists of establishing some formal relationship (usually linear 
or log-linear) between growth of output, for example, and the growth of 
GNP. Generally, GNP is specified as the independent variable as follows: 
Y. lT (5. 7) 
This method is widely used in food projection work due to the observed 
high correlation between various food uses and GNP. The empirical basis 
for this method is shown in studies such as FAO 1957 (cited in Sawers 
1977, p.16) 0hich concludes that an essential tool for projecting food 
demand is per capita income, provided income projections are available. 
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The method, moreover, also has strong supporting e'vidence from demand 
theory (Sawers ibid). Consequently, consumption projections by OECD and 
FAO have used this approach almost exclusively. 
Despite its popularity for its minimal data requirements, the method's 
economic meaning is subject to considerable controversy. It is argued 
that the choice of income as the independent variable, is an attempt to 
gauge the effect of demand on growth in food availability. The changing 
composition of demand between domestic and export production and between 
final and intermediary demand becomes quite confused in such a formulation. 
Even on straight statistical grounds, one can .argue that the high 
income - consumption correlations may not in fact imply causation. The 
contribution of agriculture to income growth would have to be explicitly 
included in the structural specification to overcome this problem. 
FAO (1970, 1971) use linear, log inverse, semi-log and double log 
functions of per capita disposable income to project food consumption at 
constant prices. The approach adopted here is similar to that of OECD 
(1968) using undeflated income (GDP) measures. 
The supply model to be estimated and used for projections is as 
follows: 
where Q output in tonnes 
r = rice 
lnQ 
r 
The corresponding demand models are as follows: 
Xr c 1 + d 1T 
lnXr = c 2 + d 2ln(GDP/head) 
where X per capita consumption in kg. 
(5. 8) 
(5. 9) 
(5 .• 10) 
8? 
5.3 Estimation and Results of Models 
The results of projections of supply and demand are in Table 5.1. 
The observed annual output of rice is contained in Table 1.7 and.Figure 1.1 
and the observed annual per capita consumption in Table 4.4 
The results of the multiple regression model have been included for 
their reasonableness. The model is as follows: 
a + B A + B P /P + S3R + B T + u 1 r 2 r c 4 (5.11) 
where, area of rice in hectares (Table 1.8) 
P price of rice. Retail prices of rice are used as 
r 
proxy for prices paid to producers (Appendix 2.3). 
P price of sugar cane (Appendix 2.3). This variable 
c 
was included to account for the sugar cane 
competition on rice land. 
R rainfall in centimeters. Average annual rainfall 
data for the Western and Labasa districts were 
used. This was done to account for the fact that 
the majority of rice grown is in the cane area. 
See data in Appendix 2.3 also. 
T time 
The estimated multiple regression equation is as follows: 
Qr - -1331851 + 2.15*A -24.4 P /P r r c 
(0.36) (79.05) 
-7.6 R + 676*T 
(4.6) (259) (5.12) 
where, R2 0. 94 
F 27. 7* 
DW = 1.716 (no autocorrelation at the 1% level) 
* significant at the 5% level 
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 
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TABLE 5 .1 
RESULTS OF PROJECTIONS OF SUPPLY AND DEMAND FOR 
RICE (IN TONNES) USING DIFFERENT MODELS 
Supply Demand 
Year 
Exponential Multip~e Simple Linear Double Log 
Time Trend Regression Time Trend1 Correlation 2 Model Model ·Model With GNP Model 
1968 17,280 17,630 24,651 25,146 
1969 17,507 18,097 25,958 25,958 
1970 17,737 20,422 27,978 27,300 
1971 17,970 16,646 28,889 28,249 
1972 18,206 16,743 30,301 29,648 
1973 18,446 16,164 31,748 31,414 
1974 18,688 18,350 33,109 33,222 
1975 18,934 22,600 34,618 34,906 
1976 19,183 19,670 35,978 35 I 978 
1977 19,435 20,937 37,548 37,250 
1978 19,690 22, 113 39,152 38,241 
1979 19,949 22,789 40,792 39,245 
1980 20, 211 23,465 42,529 40,321 
1981 20,477 24,141 44,303 41,409 
1982 20,746 24,817 46,047 42,510 
1983 21,019 25,493 47,891 43,622 
1984 21,295 26,169 49,844 44,812 
1985 21,575 36,845 51,767 46,015 
Notes: 1 See Appendix 2.1 for derivation of values in this column 
2 See Appendix 2.2 for derivation of values in this column. 
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In projecting the output of rice to 1985, rainfall, the relative . 
price of rice to cane and area are all held constant as conditions for 
projections under ceteris paribus assumption. Whilst the constancy of 
the first two variables may be acceptable, that of area may not. However, 
this may be justified if one looks at the performance during the Seventh 
Development Plan period. Table 1.9 projects the rice area to be increasing 
at 4.46% (derived from Growth Rate Tables: Brown 1965, p.4) per year 
between 1976 and 1978. The achievement,· however, is likely to result in a 
negative growth rate, i.e. about 0.2%.. Furthermore, given the greater 
promotion for cane rather than rice in the cane area and the time span 
necessary for government efforts to be effective in increasing rice 
cultivation outside the cane area, it may not be far-fetched to assume 
constant rice area up to 1985. 
The projected rice output of the multiple regression model and the 
Exponential Time Trend Model, though they are slightly different, both 
display upward trends. The trend of the former is more optimistic. However, 
its implications on practicality are still within the realm of possibilities. 
l For instance, the estimated yield by 1980 will be about 3.1 tonnes/hectare. 
Present yields have certainly achieved or exceeded this level. 
The projected rice demand using a Simple Linear Time Trend Model and 
a Dquble Log Correlation with GNP Model, though slightly different, both 
display again similar trends. In calculating the GNP/head to 1985, the 
GNP was assumed to continue its projected growth rate of the Seventh 
Development Plan period, i.e. 7.3% annually. Population was projected to 
grow at the annual growth rate of 1.9%, i.e. the mid-1977 estimate 
(Current Economic Statistics 1978). The results of this calculation are 
detailed in ~ppendix 2.4. 
l With the area of rice assumed constant to 1985, it can only be said that 
this relatively high yield is realized through greater productivity. 
85 
The results of projections are graphed in Figure 5.1. And regardless 
of whichever supply or demand trend is used, the conclusion is the same. 
That is that, given the present production and consumption conditions and 
policies, supply and demand for rice are unlikely to be reconciled, i.e. rice 
output would increase but is not likely to increase proportionately more 
than demand. The implication of the ineffectiveness of Food Self-Sufficiency 
Policy in terms of rice becomes clear. 
Taking the most conservative estimate of the difference between demand 
and supply by 1985, i.e. 46,015 less 26,845 = 19,170 tonnes, it can be seen 
that this quantity, 19,170 tonnes, that have to be imported, is quite 
substantial. Comparing this to the data on imported rice quantity 
(vide Table 1.6) on hand, it can be seen that this quantity will be some 
2,000 tonnes in excess of the highest quantity realized between 1968 and 
1975. As a matter of fact, the 1976 import figure has exceeded this 
projected level. It appears, therefore, that the projected increases in 
rice.import implied in Figure 5.1 are valid but are rather underestimated 
by the models. 
Evaluating this quantity at the 1977 import unit value index for cereals 
(vide Table 1.5), it can be seen that the total value of this import would 
have cost some $4.6 million 
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CHAPTER 6 
EVALUATION OF CURRENT GOVERNMENT POLICIES 
6.1 Preamble 
The results of Chapter 3 provide an indication of the ineffectiveness 
of the current Food Self-Sufficiency Policy as it relates to rice. It seems 
expedient, therefore, to take a closer look at the Policy or its various 
components in order to investigate their performance or lack of it. 
This chapter, therefore, discusses ve.ry briefly the various policies 
that are integral parts of the wider Food Self-Sufficiency Policy. And then 
by treating them as a package of policies, it discusses its performance in 
respect to the results of Chapter 3. The treatment of the various policies 
as a package follows from the fact that the activities of a production 
unit are the results of responses to a wide range of influences (of 
government policies) rather than a single influence. 
In evaluating this package of policies, discussions will focus on 
rice on the strength of the results of Chapter 3. However, the same 
package. of policies that affects rice also affects other commodities. 
Therefore, any policy implications that may emerge from this discussion may 
be implicitly taken as applicable to other commodities as well. 
6.2 Current Government Policies 
The various policies that are incorporated under the wider Food Self-
Sufficiency Policy fall into three categories, viz: Agricultural Subsidies, 
Agricultural Infrastructure and International Trade Policies. 1 
Agricultural inputs that are subsidized include fertilizers, agro-
chemicals, farm capital, fencing wires and posts, irrigation water, freight 
1 A complication that arises here is the identification of policies that 
specifically relate to the Food Self-Sufficiency Policy per se from 
those that are concomitant with the country's development even if a 
Food Self-Sufficiency Programme ha.a not been implemented. No solution 
can be offered except to acknowledge the existence of the problem in the 
discussions that follow. 
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charges and certified rice seeds. 
Using Wharton's (1967, p.109) classification, two groups of 
agricultural infrastructures are provided for, Those that need relatively 
higher levels of capital investment (called capital intensive) and those 
which have lower capital intensity. The former includes drainage and 
irrigation; transport; utilities and marketing facilities. The latter 
are those in which the capital component is low, e.g. extension services; 
some type of agricultural research, crop and animal protection, control 
and grading service; soil conservation; credit and financial institutions; 
and education and health facilities. The distinction'between the two is 
arbitrary, in that the proportion of capital costs in the total costs per 
unit of service varies throughout a wide spectrum. But at the capital-
intensive end of this spe·ctrum, the heavy investment requires choices that 
turn upon the traditional economic criteria for investment in non-human, 
reproducible capital. Infrastructures at the extensive end, by contrast, 
do not compete heavily for capital, but may require substantial recurring 
operational funds, especially for salaries. 
As regards international trade policies, a clarification is in order 
at this juncture. The policies mentioned above as integral parts 0£ the 
. 
Food Self-Sufficiency Policy, represent a government intervention in the 
market of internationally-traded goods. As such, trade in these goods will 
be affected, thus affecting Fiji's trading relations with the rest of the 
world. 
However, there exist specific trade policies that have a more direct 
effect on Fiji's trading rerations with the rest of the world. Between 1975 
and 1976, proposals for a tariff on imported rice were turned down by the 
government. However, in 1978, the government opted for import quotas on 
rice. The principal reason for the imposition of this import regulation was 
the need to effectively support local rice production, i.e. by restricting 
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the inflow of cheap imported rice into the Fiji market, thus mitigating 
or eliminating their disincentive effects on local rice production. 
Effects of such a policy on the relative prices of imported rice 
vis-a-vis local rice may be quite immediate.1 However, its effects on 
actual production may take time to be apparenL Therefore, it is unlikely 
that its impact has been felt by the rice growers. Consequently, 
consideration of this policy has been left out in the discussions that 
follow. 
6.3 Evaluation of Current Government Policies 
In any evaluation process, one has to ask whether the predetermined 
goals are being achieved. One has to study the 'efficiency with which 
these goals are being achieved and/or the reasons why they are not. In 
studying the efficiency of any system, one normally looks at the ratio of 
the value of output to the value of input. It follows that the efficiency 
of any process can change with changes in valuations, and because everything 
depends upon everything else, any change at all in any subjective preference 
is in principle capable of altering the efficiency of any process. Once 
efficiencies are estimated, positive decision making can be executed. For 
instance, any system that is found efficient (i.e. based on some efficiency 
criterion) , can provide grounds for its justification and continuation. If 
found inefficient, the system or the policy can either be rejected, modified 
or replaced by an alternative policy. 
The policy evaluation approach adopted here is not very rigorous. 
The more scientific approach of evaluating the inputs to the system and 
1 As we see in Table 4.8, however, imported rice is still by far the 
cheaper rice. It follows, therefore, that the expectation that 
imported rice would become more expensive than local rice has not 
been consistently fulfilled. The price differential, however, may 
have been reduced to some extent. 
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the outputs that are derived and subjecting the result to some predetermined 
efficiency criterion, e.g. a Benefit/Cost ratio or Social Cost Benefit 
Analysis cannot be used, g_iven data limitation and our knowledge of policy 
1 decision theory. Instead, a less rigorous approach is adopted. That is 
to incorporate the results of Chapter 3 into the discussions and to assume 
that the interactions of the inputs and outputs have been translated into 
the graphs of the supply and demand trends in Figure 5.1, to derive what 
2 
can be termed as a 'divergent gap' as far .as rice is concerned. This gap 
may be regarded as a measure of the iefficiency' of the system. As mentioned 
earlier, a divergent gap is taken to represent the ineffectivenss of the Food 
Self-Sufficiency Policy. Further evaluative discussions must necessarily 
ensue. 
In studying a package of. policies and the reasons for its ineffective-
ness, three specific areas can be looked at, viz: the design of the 
package, the implementation and the appraisal stages. As a package, 
intended to provide a comprehensive range of services to the farming sector,. 
little fault can be found with its design. This, however, does not 
necessarily mean that individual policies or components of a policy always 
h . 3 ave perfect designs. 
1 This in itself is a separate study area which could be looked into in the 
future. 
2 It should be noted that if-supply and demand trends are diverging based on 
past trends, then those trends will be projected into the future, since an 
inherent assumption in projections of .the type used in this study is that 
existing policies etc. rema{n unchanged~ On this basis, therefore, future 
trends will be continuous rather than discontinuous from past trends. 
3 A good example is the Rewa Irrig~tion Schem~ whose earlier OlJC~ration had 
been constrained by defects in the original design and planning. ~~oreover, 
its siting appears to have been a ;faux pas as well. To pursue an approach 
that would rigorously evaluate the designs etc. of individual policies 
in order to come up with positive poiicy implications is beyond the s~ope 
of this study. 
Production subsidies are designed to promote production for which 
inputs are being subsidized, General Equilibrium Analysis such as that 
in Appendix 3,1 provides justification1 . As regards agricultural 
infrastructures, these have always gone hand in hand with agricultural 
development. Moreover, they have been occasionally linked with external 
economies, i.e. in their capacity to lower factor input and product 
marketing costs to the firm or industry, thus enabling a shift in the 
industry supply curve to the right. Apart from their effect on lowering 
costs, some infrastructures may affect the shape and position of the 
production function directly or indirectly. Agricultural Research, for 
instance, that produces a new hybrid rice seed, can directly alter the 
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production surface. On the other hand, programs of crop protection increase 
the effective harvest and reduce storage losses, etc. and consequently alter 
the levels of effective market supply and returns. 
As a package, therefore, these individual policies initiate an overall 
promotion of agricultural development in all aspects, i.e. production, 
marketing and consumption. Thus from a design standpoint, it appears 
satisfactory. 
When looking at the implementation of such a policy package, one must 
necessarily look at the coordination and organizational aspects. And these 
are the areas where the Food Self-Sufficiency Policy seems to be weakest 
as regards its impact on rice. 
To achieve coordination within a system, the relevant factors or aspects 
.have to be arranged in a correct relationship and to be working together 
efficiently and harmoniously. This does not always happen. Many examples 
can be found. One that relates to rice is of particular significance. That 
l See particularly the effect of the production subsidy component of a 
tariff in the Appendix. A Partial Equilibrium Analysis a.lso provides 
the same justification if one is interested.in a specific commodity. 
For methodology, see Caves and Jones (1977) for instance. 
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is the lack of acceptance of new rice seeds by the rice growers. It 
appears that when researchers release a new rice seed, there is insufficient 
effort directed at breaking down growers' resistance or conditioning them 
to accept the innovation. The variety, 'Bila' that was released in 1976 
was one example, and its unfavourable reception by the rice growers 1 
contributed sUbstantially to the failure to achieve the targets for rainfed 
rice between 1976 and 1977 (see e.g. DP 7 Review op cit p.24). 
Farmers resistance can be explained by their lack of familiarity 
with the new input. At first, therefore, their demand for this input 
would be relatively inelastic, However, with more knowledge and experience 
which any conditioning process is likely to conduce, farmers demand would 
tend to be relatively elastic over time .. Therefore, given a drop in the 
price (through a sUbsidy for instance), there will be a greater than 
proportionate increase in the quantity demanded of these inputs. 
With familiarity established and the use of the new input a likely 
proposition, other aspects need to be ensured. Firstly, is the assurance 
that costs remain stable and relatively low, This would determine a 
farmer's rate of absorption of the input. Secondly, the supply of that 
input needs to be guaranteed so that demand is invariably satisfied. 
Failure to satisfy demand will mean a reversion, not only in the use of the 
inferior input that used to be applied previously, but also in the state 
of mind of the farmer. 
A guarantee does not only apply to supplies of inputs. It also applies 
to outlets of agricultural produce, A guarantee of outlet is a well-
documented incentive for producers. It not only helps the farmer to plan 
his production systematically, but also assits him to allocate his 
resources in such a way so as to maximize his returns. 
l The writer came to know later that the variety was intended for wet 
conditions and those who showed resistance towards it were those not 
intended to have received the new seeds. This only goes to highlight 
the need for better coordination and efficiency~ 
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Guaranteeing an outlet must, invariably, be coordinated with other 
aspects of marketing, e.g. transport facilities. This problem of transport 
however, is particularly felt by other bulky and more commercialized 
commodities, e.g. beef cattle. This does not necessarily me.an that all 
rice marketing aspects are well coordinated. If they were this particular 
chapter would not have been necessary. 
A guarantee could also apply to prices of agricultural produce. ~ny 
pricing policy that is positively1-oriented must accelerate the growth of 
agricultural output; it must achieve the crop-mix desired and it must 
secure increases in the marketed surplus from the predominantly-subsistence 
sector. Furthermore, farmers should have clear knowledge about the prices 
in advance, and the implementation of the policy should continue over a 
sufficient time. 
The guaranteed prices for rice offered by the government-sponsored Rewa 
Rice Ltd. fall short of the objectives mentioned above. The effort by the 
Rewa Rice Ltd. to guarantee prices is extremely localized and it seems 
overshadowed by the complexities of the rice market conditions. The nature 
of rice, being storable and predominantly subsistent, and moreover, the 
decentralization of milling facilities and the variability of prices at 
any one time, all contribute to the complexities. Streamlining these factors 
is not simple. However, some effort has to be made in this direction before 
any pricing policy becomes fully workable. 
1 Economists talk about two categories of price policies - the negative and 
positive policies. The former constitutes a deliberate attempt to depress 
the agriculture's terms of trade in order that agricultural produce and 
raw materials remain cheap for the growing industrial sector. The latter 
i~proves or at least maintains the terms of trade of agriculture. The 
government, according to the indications in the rhetoric of government 
plans, appears sympathetic to the positive price policies. Being 
sympathetic to a policy and to be actually implementing it, however, are 
two different issues. Indications are that practice of this policy 
appears lacking. 
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Some organizational aspects 0f the policy package have been touched 
on in the preceding discussions since coordination and organization are 
closely related. The latter also implies some sort of arrangement of 
factors that is systematic and efficient. This, too, seems deficient in 
some aspects of the Food-Self~Sufficiency Policy. 
Organization of resources to cater for the more urgent needs in the 
implementation of the policy was lacking at times. For instance, on 
occasions~ Extension officers have been immobilized and become ineffective 
due to lack of appropriate facilities. The allocation of staff, 
particularly the professionals who are in short supply, to shoulder many 
responsibilities, tend~ to reduce productivity. On the other hand, certain 
projects have not had opportunities to contribute to productivity because 
they had been shelved due to lack of appropriate personnel. 
The lack of financial resources sufficient to fund all the activities 
necessary for the success of the Food Self-Sufficiency Policy seems to be 
an overriding factor. 
The last area of the policy package to be looked at is the appraisal 
or some form of evaluative process to gauge the effectiveness, not 
necessarily of the package as a whole, but also of components of this 
package. Knowledge of the effectiveness of various policies initiates 
wise decision making. It is likely to assist in the optimal allocation 
of the scarce resource and in the scheduling of projects or activities 
in order to maximize benefits or in some cost-effective fashion. 
With this knowledge, decision makers can also establish causality, 
complementarity and interdependence amongst various activities. And given 
funds, decisions on project choice, timing, sequence, combination, location 
and linkages can be effectively streamlined. 
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There appears to be a dearth of knowledge in this area at present. 
Admittedly, studies of this sort may be costly since good reliable data 
have to be recorded and reference points established. Moreover, results 
which attempt to account for primary and secondary benefits etc. which may 
necessitate value judgement, may in the final analysis prove spurious. 
However, there is still room for evaluation in some more important 
aspects of the policy or in the use of less sophisticated evaluative 
techniques. 
Agricultural marketing efficiency is one aspect that has been studied 
frequently in other countries. Some of the approaches can easily be 
adopted in Fiji. Bain's (cited in Abbot 1967, p.371) measures of 
efficiency, for instance, can be envisaged with the following strategic 
dimensions: 
a. Cost and profit margins approach the level that is just 
sufficient to reward investment at the going rate; it 
should also provide an incentive for risk bearing and 
the introduction of innovations designed to save costs 
·or improve services. 
b. Size and number of firms. 
c. Service provided . 
. Because there can be no absolute standard, efficiency is generally measured 
by comparison within and between marketing sectors. 
Two other marketing efficiency measures, viz: Pricing Efficiency 
and Technical Knowledge Efficiency can also be studied. The former represents 
the efficiency in the transmission of price signals through the marketing 
channels from the consumers to the producers. The latter measures how 
well the producers know the requirements of consumers in technical terms 
and, similarly, how well consumers know the technical constraints on 
production. 
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The use of less sophisticated evaluative techniques has some scope 
in Extension for instance. Even 'the crudest estimates of the ratio of 
primary benefits to costs may not be appropriate to eval.uate Extension 
per se, but they may be sufficient measures for assessing the relative 
economic efficiencies 0£ alternative Extension methods. 
·Moreover, in the area of capital-intensive agricultural infrastructures, 
similar simple approaches can be envisaged. Tolani and Stanton (cited in 
Wharton op cit, p.117), for example, suggest two methods, viz: 
to net national product' and 'value added to capital ratio'. 
'addition 
Hirschman (ibid, p.118) suggests an 'efficient sequences' approach, i.e. 
choosing projects based on a sequence that does not drastically change 
predetermined rates of return. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSIONS AND SOME IMPLICATIONS 
Fiji's Food Self-Sufficiency Policy must be viev'ed in very broad 
perspective. The policy itself represents a mix of policy instruments 
and objectives relating to such areas as external accounting, nutritional, 
technological, welfare and even political considerations. The policy is 
justifi~d on these grounds or by the multiplicity of their various 
interactions. To ignore this broad and multi-disciplinary approach to 
the policy and to view it from a restricted perspective e.g. on purely 
economic grounds, it may appear that the policy is invalidated and 
indefensible. 
Also important is the need to view the policy within the general 
framework of the economy and the direction to which it is going. 
Relevant considerations here are the need to understand the relatively 
high propensity to import, not only in terms of food imports but also 
in.others, inherent in marginal micro-economy like Fiji, and the apparent 
stagnation of local production of some major commodity e.g. rice. 
These considerations create a prima facie case for a Food Self-
Sufficiency Policy particularly that which lays emphasis on rice. 
After analysing the empirical data available on rice, however, one 
intuitively concludes that certain incon~istenci~s exist and that the 
predetermined goals and directions of the policy are not quite being 
achieved. Formulation of hypotheses as provisional explanations of observed 
facts, therefore, becomes necessary. 
The hypothesis that the decline in.the rice area is due to competition 
from sugar cane should, ideally, be conclusively established by graphical 
illustration of an inverse relationship between rice area and cane area 
in the localities where both commodities are found. This, however, could 
not be demonstrated due to unavailability of data. The hypothesis was 
therefore substantiated using logical arguments based on reasonable 
assumptions and historical justifications. .Moreover, a rice acreage 
response study using statistical methods to further analyse this 
competition was attempted. 
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Discussions on the second hypothesis that the increase in rice imports 
was due to a host of factors focussed on these various factors including 
domestic supply and demand conditions, population, income and government 
intervention. Furthermore, discussions also focussed on external factors 
e.g. overseas supply and demand conditions and exchange rate. A combination 
of these factors rather than any single factor was established to be 
responsible f.or the increases in rice imports. 
These two hypotheses looked at both the supply and demand aspects of 
rice. The stage was set~ therefore, to estimate statistically both the 
past and future trends of supply and demand for rice so as to gauge the 
effectiveness or otherwise of the Food Self-Sufficiency Policy, 
The ineffectiveness of the rice self-sufficiency policy was demonstrated 
by the fact that the supply and demand trend lines were diverging. rather 
than converging. These trend lines were then projected into the future, 
ceteris paribus, and the conclusion that the trend lines will become more 
divergent, with the implication that rice imports will tend to increase, 
was reached. These increased rice imports have been borne out by recent 
rice impo~t statistics. 
The final hypothesis that government policies have not performed as 
well as expected was then discussed in the light of the results of the 
statistical estimation. All the government policies within the framework 
of the wider Fbod Self-Sufficiency Policy were then ~reated as a package 
of policies and then evaluated under three areas, viz: the design of the 
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package, its implementation and appraisal stages. 
Whilst there were no apparent inconsistencies relating to the design 
of the package, there was evidence of inconsistencies in the implementation 
and appraisal stages of this package of policies. These are the likely 
areas for further policy formulation. 
APPENDIX 1.1 
FIJI'S TRADE BALANCE, 1965-1975. 
(F$m) 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
1965 47.2 38.2 - 9.1 
1966 39.8 34.8 - 4.9 
1967 45.7 28.1 - 7.6 
1968 55.3 43.3 -12.0 
19691 69.1 47.3 -21.8 
1970 80.6 54.1 -26.5 
1971 97.3 54.5 -42.8 
1972 115.1 58.7 -56.4 
1973 152.9 65.7 -87.2 
1974 188.8 114. 7 -74.1 
1975 2 191.4 130. 8 -60:6 
Notes: 1 1969-1975 revised series 
2 provisional 
Source: IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
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APPENDIX 1.2 
SUMMARY OF FIJI'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 
1965 - 1975 
(F$m) 
1965 66 67 68 69 1 70 71 
Current Account -11. 9 - 5.7 - 6.2 -10.8 -14.6 -12.3 -23.7 
Capital Account 4.3 2.3 2.0 6.1 6.7 13.2 12.1 
Monetary Sector 1. 2 - 0.6 - 1. 2 - - 3.5 - 2.3 0.6 
Net Errors & Omissions 2.5 1.1 5.0 5.4 16.9 2.5 20.4 
Reserves & Related 
Items (- = increase) 3.9 2.9 0.4 - 0.7 - 5.5 - 1.1 - 9.4 
Notes: 1 1969-1975 revised series 
2 provisional 
3 includes F$1.2m from allocation of SDR's 
Source: IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
72 73 
-26.0 -43.8 
21. 3 38.8 
7.3 13.6 
18.5 - 4.8 
-22.3 3 
- 3.8 
74 
-23.4 
37.6 
3.3 
9.5 
-27.0 
75 2 
- 7.2 
40.4 
- 0.1 
6.0 
-39.1 
·f--' 
0 
f--' 
Year 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
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APPENDIX 1.3 
PROPORTION OF FOOD IMPORTS AND TOTAL IMPORTS TO GDP 
GDP 
(at current 
prices) 
(F$000) 
116,800 
119,700 
.130,800 
145,800 
159,300 
191,800 
211, 800 
261,300 
338,300 
450,000 
536,000 
Total 
Imports 
(F$000) 
58,162 
50,545 
56,291 
68,402 
77,888 
90,502 
111,550 
131, 549 
174,645 
219,331 
220,967 
Food 
Imports 
(F$000) 
12,202 
11,684 
12,651 
13, 329 
15,281 
16,884 
20,643 
25, 013 
33,909 
41,302 
38,504 
Proportion 
of Total 
Imports 
to GDP 1 
49.8 
42.2 
43.0 
46.9 
48.9 
47.2 
52.6 
50.3 
51.6. 
48.7 
41. 2 
Proportion 
of Food 
Imports 
to GDP 2 
10.4 
9.8 
9.7 
9.1 
9.6 
8.8 
9.7 
9.6 
10.0 
9.2 
7.2 
Notes: l A simple time trend analysis of these data reveals that there 
had not been any significant change in the porportion of total 
imports to GDP during the period studied. The analysis results were: 
2 b = 0.175, r = 0.151, r = 0.023 and t(r) = 0.458. 
2 A similar time trend analysis reveals a significant negative 
correlation between the data in this column and the time 
variable (r = -0.587*). However, there does not seem to be any 
significant downward trend. * indicates statistical significance 
at the 10% level. 
Sources: l Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
2 IBRD Report No. 1296-FIJ 
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APPENDIX 2.1 
RESULTS OF PROJECTION OF THE DEMAND 
FOR RICE USING SIMPLE LINEAR TIME TREND MODELl 
Projected Per Projected Total 
Capita Consumption 
Year Population Consumption of Rice 
( 1 000) of Rice (tonnes) 
(Kg) 
1968 495 49.8 24,651 
1969 506 51. 3 25,958 
1970 521 53.7 27,978 
1971 533 54.2 28,889 
1972 544 55.7 30,301 
1973 556 57.1 31,748 
1974 565 58.6 33,109 
1975 576 60.1 34,618 
1976 585 61. 5 35,978 
1977 596 63.0 37,548 
1978 607 64.5 39;152 
1979 619 65.9 40,792 
1980 631 67.4 42,529 
1981 643 68.9 44,303 
1982 655 70.3 46,047 
1983 667 71.8 47,891 
1984 680 73.3 49,844 
1985 693 74.7 51,767 
Note: 1 Based on Data in Table 4.4 
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APPENDIX 2.2 
RESULTS OF PROJECTION OF THE DEMAND FOR 
RICE USING DOUBLE LOG CORRELATION WITH GNP MODEL1 
Projected Per Projected Total 
Capita Consumption 
Year Population Consumption of Rice 
( '000) of Rice (tonnes) 
(Kg) 
1968 495 50.8 25,146 
1969 506 51. 3 25,958 
1970 521 52.4 27,300 
1971 533 53.0 28,249 
1972 544 54.5 29,648 
1973 556 56.5 31,414 
1974 565 58.8 33,222 
1975 576 60.6 34,906 
1976 585 61. 5 35,978 
1977 596 62.5 37,250 
1978 607 63.0 38,241 
1979 619 63.4 39,245 
1980 631 63.9 40,321 
1981 643 64.4 41,409 
1982 655 64.9 42,510 
1983 667 65.4 43,622 
1984 680 65.9 44,812 
1985 693 66.4 46,015 
Note: l Based on Data in Table 4.4 
APPENDIX 2.3 
OTHER DATA USED FOR THE PROJECTION OF 
RICE PRODUCTION 
Retail Price Price of 
Year of Rice Cane Ra inf all 
($/tonne) ($/tonne) (cm) 
1967 277 6.23 187.7 
1968 284 6.40 185.9 
1969 291 6.62 99.8 
1970 298 7.62 197.9 
1971 280 7.95 277. 3 
1972 265 9.90 373 .. l 
1973 309 9.76 244.2 
1974 463 20.57 323.8 
1975 437 31.60 238.9 
1976 364 24.18 264.7 
1977 377 24.58 214.2 
1978 483 24.98 163.7 
Sources: l Bureau of Statistics (personal communication) 
2 Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978 
3 Annual Statistical Abstract, 1969-1971 
4 Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries (personal 
communication) 
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Year 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
APPENDIX 2. 4 
DATA ON POPULATION AND GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT (GDP) 
AND THEIR RESPECTIVE PROJECTED VALUES,1968-1985 1 
Population GDP GDP/head 
( 'OOO) (F$m) ($) 
495 129.6 262 
506 140.5 278 
521 168.9 324 
533 184.7 347 
544 230.5 424 
556 300.6 541 
565 400.0 708 
576 502.4 872 
585 558.5 955 
596 636.2 1067 
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------ ------ - - - - -------
1978 607 682.6 1125 
1979 619 732.4 1183 
1980 631 785.9 1245 
1981 643 843.3 1312 
1982 655 904.9 1381 
1983 667 971.0 1456 
1984 680 1041.9 1532 
1985 693 1117.0 1612 
Note: 1 Values below the dotted line are the projected values 
Source: Current Economic Statistics, 1969-1978. 
Other 
Commodities 
T 
w 
W' 
0 
APPENDIX 3. 1 
TARIFF ON RICE IMPORTS AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON THE ECONOMY 
GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 
(not drawn to scale) 
.K y 
I 0 
I 1 
G T' C E 
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D F 
rice 
rice consumers and other producers to rice producers and 
other consumers and to government - the latter in the form 
of government revenue. 
(v) Welfare effect 
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There has been a net loss in welfare represented by the shift 
from Y
0 
to Y2 of the real income level and the decline in 
national income in rice units from OF to OE. 
FD decrease in national income in rice units due to 
production subsidy component. 
DE dedrease in national income in rice units due to 
consumption tax component. 
The decline from OW to OW' of the production of other commodities 
is realized because of the expected increased outflow of resources from 
those commodities to the rice industry. 
ABBOTT, J.C. 
ANDERSON, K. 
AZIZ, S. (ed.) 
BARTON, G.T. 
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